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The debt-collection business is booming, led by a dramatic increase
in the sale and collection of defaulted debts. Annually, debt buyers
purchase more than $100 billion in debt (based on the debts' face value).
In a typical debt purchase, buyers pay only a small fraction of face value;
in return, they receive extremely limited and often inaccurate informa-
tion. Many of the debts that buyers seek to recover are dead debts be-
cause they never existed, or are no longer enforceable by operation of
law. Consumers who receive communications from debt buyers often
complain about mistaken identity and identity theft, because they did not
incur the alleged debts. Other debt-collection issues arise when debt buy-
ers seek to recover debts that have previously been paid or settled, dis-
charged in bankruptcy, or have become time-barred because the
collection period under the statute of limitations has expired.
By obtaining judgments, or persuading consumers to pay a portion
of these debts, acknowledge these debts, or enter into new agreements,
collectors can resurrect and enforce dead or non-existent debts. The me-
dia has labeled these resurrected debts as "zombie debts."' Just as the
zombies in movies come back from the dead to terrorize individuals, dead
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1. See, e.g., Liz Pulliam Weston, 'Zombie' Debt is Hard to Kill, EDUC. CTR. 2000,
http://educationcenter2000.com/debt collectors/zombie.htm (last visited July 19, 2013)
(originally published at MSN Money in July 2006); Madan G. Singh, Zombie Debts, a
Discussion, EZINEARTICLES.COM (Feb. 10, 2012), http://ezinearticles.com/?Zombie-
Debts,-a-Discussion&id=6872870. Zombie debts have also become a subject of sev-
eral blog entries. See, e.g., Jonathan Ginsberg, How Debt Buyers Turn Zombie Debt
into Valid Claims, BANKR. LAW NETWORK (Oct.18, 2011), http://www.bankruptcylaw
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debts may resurface to wreak havoc on consumers. Even if a consumer
successfully defeats one zombie-debt collector, the process may restart if
the debt is resold.
Legal scholarship has only begun to address zombie-debt issues, and
has primarily focused on litigation. However, collectors are often success-
ful in persuading consumers to pay dead debts without filing lawsuits.
Accordingly, this Article addresses zombie-debt issues that consum-
ers face before the onset of litigation. It identifies the failure of tradi-
tional methods to deal with this growing problem, and proposes
amendments to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA")2 to
establish uniform standards for the transfer of information and documen-
tation to debt buyers and consumers. It recommends that penalties and
statutes of limitation should deter debt buyers from violating the FDCPA.
Finally, the article emphasizes the importance of providing assistance and
education to consumers, and suggests that the recently formed Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB") should coordinate a holistic ap-
proach at the federal, state, and local levels to combat zombie debts.
INTRODUCTION
"Something coming back from the dead was almost always bad
news. Movies taught me that. For every one Jesus, you get a million
zombies. "'
A. A Horror Story
1. The Opening: A Peaceful Setting
Grandparents, Harry and Helen Cooper, are enjoying dinner at
their Florida home with their granddaughter when the phone rings.
2. The Confrontation
Caller: "May I speak with Henry Cooper?"
Harry: "My name is Harry Cooper. I do not know Henry
Cooper. You must have the wrong number."
Caller: "No, our records indicate that I have the right num-
ber. I am here to offer you a one-time deal that will help clean up
your credit report. You currently owe a debt of over $3,500; how-
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2010).
3. DAVID WONG, JOHN DIES AT THE END 260 (2009).
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ever, if you work with us we should be able to reduce the amount.
Are you willing to work with us?"
Harry: "Why would I work with you? I do not know you, or
what you are calling about. You have disturbed my dinner with
my grandchild."
Caller: "I am sorry about the disturbance, but if you had
paid this debt I would not be calling. If you work with me today,
you can prevent future calls. I work for Romero Recovery
Associates."
Harry: "Romero who? I do not recognize the name. I do not
have a debt with you."
Caller: "Romero Recovery Associates is the current owner
of a credit-card debt that you had with Guardian Trust Bank in
1995. Now let us see what we can do about resolving this matter.
If you agree, to a three-month payment plan to cure this debt, I
can reduce the outstanding debt by 50 percent."
Harry: "1995 seems like a long time ago. I am not sure that I
ever had an account with Guardian, and even if I did, I am confi-
dent that I would have paid it. I always pay my debts. I just want
to get back to my dinner with my wife and granddaughter. "
Caller: "Well, our records show that you still owe this debt. I
do not want to take you away from your grandchild, but my man-
ager says that I can only offer this deal today. Can you show me
some good faith by agreeing to pay $25, today? That will keep the
settlement offer open as well as allow you time to return to your
grandchild. We can then discuss this matter when you have more
time."
Harry: "I do not recall this debt, but my granddaughter is
leaving tonight and I really want to get back with her. I will pay
you the $25 to keep the deal open."
3. The Epilogue
In the above encounter, Harry possibly faces a zombie-debt issue. A
debt that may have never existed, or that Harry had already paid, or that
may be time-barred, is now enforceable because Harry agreed to pay the
nominal amount of $25.
B. Confronting the Horror
Classic horror films depict zombies as deformed flesh-eating mon-
sters that have come back from the dead to attack the living.' Moreover,
4. See, e.g., NIGHT OF THE LIVING DEAD (Image Ten, Laurel Group, Market
Square Productions & Off Color Films 1968) (following the crash of a satellite, the
dead come back to life as zombies seeking to eat the living); DAWN OF THE DEAD
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they are extremely hard to kill.' While the zombies in these films are only
fictional,6 a non-fictional zombie now exists in debt collection that has
created real fear for consumers. Like the cinematic zombie who seems to
arise from the dead, zombie debt is a debt that is dead or non-existent,
but has now come to life, and is wreaking havoc on consumers and their
credit histories.
The origins of zombie debt vary.' They include debts that have been
previously paid or settled, debts that have been discharged in bankruptcy,
debts that do not belong to the alleged debtor (due to mistaken identity
or identity theft), or debts for which the statutory period for collection
has expired.' Although these debts are typically considered unenforce-
able, aggressive collectors can resurrect "dead" debts into live or zombie
debts. 0 Collectors can achieve this transformation when they persuade
consumers to pay some amount against their debts, acknowledge the
debts, or enter into new agreements." Moreover, collectors may sue on
dead debts and obtain judgments, typically by default; these judgments
resurrect dead debts to enforceable debts.12
Just as in horror movies where the zombie population seems to grow
at an exponential rate,13 the number of individuals attacked by zombie
(Laurel Group 1978) (depicting individuals seeking refuge from flesh-eating zombies
hiding in a deserted mall). For a listing of 250 zombie films, see IheartZombies1,
Zombies, Zombies, Zombies 300Films, IMDB (Mar. 4, 2011) http://www.imdb.com!
list/qlEFAbRWd40/?start=1&view=compact&sort=listorian:asc.
5. James, How to Kill a Zombie: Ten Best Ways to Kill a Zombie, YAHOO
VoIcEs, http://voices.yahoo.com/how-kill-zombie-ten-best-ways-kill-zombie-4740282.
html (Oct. 27, 2009) ("The undead are notoriously difficult to kill, the base reason
being because they are already dead.").
6. Although the Hollywood films are fictional, scholars have addressed the role
of zombies in folklore from Haiti and Africa. See, e.g., Hans-W. Ackermann & Je-
anine Gauthier, The Ways and Nature of the Zombi, 104 J. AM. FOLKLORE 466 (1991);
Louis P. Mars, The Story of Zombi in Haiti, 45 MAN: A RECORD OF ANTHROPOLOGI-
CAL SCIENCE 38 (1945).
7. Michael Forbes, Beware the "Zombie" Debt Collectors: Consumer Rights




8. Weston, supra note 1.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra Part III.A.1-3.
12. See infra Part II.A.4.
13. See, e.g., DAWN OF THE DEAD, supra note 4. IMDB describes the "ever-grow-
ing epidemic of zombies" in the Dawn of the Dead. Dawn of the Dead, IMDB, http://
www.imdb.com/title/tt0077402/ (last visited Jun. 19, 2013). Interestingly, some math
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debts has also exploded in recent years due to the growth of the debt-
buying industry.14 Debt buyers are a relatively new but rapidly-growing
"breed" of collectors who purchase debts at a fraction of their face
value." Buyers have different motivations than creditors who may seek
future transactions with consumers, or collectors who operate on a com-
mission basis.16 Instead, motivated by their financial stake in the pur-
chased debts, they have no expectation of future dealings with alleged
debtors." Thus, debt buyers tend to be more aggressive than creditors, or
commission-based collectors."
Debt buyers often purchase debts based on insufficient or inaccu-
rate information provided by sellers.19 They typically receive only sum-
mary data and little-if any-documentation on their purchased debts.
Moreover, what limited information provided may be inaccurate.2 0 Con-
sequently, buyers often try to recover from people who are not actual
debtors or from people who have already paid or settled their debts.21
Additionally, buyers often direct their collection efforts at unenforceable
debts, including debts discharged in bankruptcy and those for which the
limitations period on any collection claim has expired.22
Although media sources and blog entries have popularized the term
"zombie debt,"23 legal scholarship has only begun to address the issue.24
educators use the rapid rise in the zombie population as an example of exponential
growth. See, e.g., Engaging and Motivating with Zombie Exponential Growth, http://
orielly.weebly.com/motivating-with-zombie-exponential-growth.html (last visited July
19, 2013).
14. See infra Part III.B.
15. Gary Rivlin, America's Abusive Debt Collectors, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1, 2012,
http://www.newsweek.com/americas-abusive-debt-collectors-64201; see infra, notes
192-96 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part III.B.2.
17. Id.
18. Id.




23. See supra note I and accompanying text.
24. See Victoria J. Haneman, The Ethical Exploitation of the Unrepresented Con-
sumer, 73 Mo. L. REv. 707, 712 & n.23 (2008); Peter A. Holland, The One Hundred
Billion Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court: Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in
Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 259, 259 (2011); Lauren Goldberg, Note,
Dealing in Debt: The High-Stakes World of Debt Collection After FDCPA, 79 S. CAL.
L. REv. 711 (2006); Young Walgenkim, Comment, Killing "Zombie Debt" Through
Clarity And Consistency in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 24 Loy. CONSUMER
L. REv. 65 (2011-12). Joshua Warren has created a blog, Zombie Law, dedicated to
the identification of zombies in politics and the law. About ZombieLaw, ZOMBIELAW,
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Scholarship has primarily focused on the collection of unenforeceable
debts through the court system.25 However, abuses are not limited to liti-
gation. Zombie-debt concerns begin with communications between con-
sumers and collectors.26 Collectors are often successful in persuading
consumers to pay dead debts without filing lawsuits.
This Article focuses on attacking zombie debts at the pre-litigation
stage. While efforts to combat zombie debts should be developed at all
levels, battling these demons before litigation will also help reduce the
incidence of subsequent problems at the litigation and post-litigation
stages. This Article examines the roots and problems associated with
zombie debts. Part I briefly describes the consumer-debt crisis in the
http://zombielaw.wordpress.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2013). He is also creating a
casebook to discuss over 300 federal cases that refer to "zombies." See ZombieLaw
THE BOOK, ZOMBIELAW, http://zombielaw.wordpress.com/zombielaw-the-book/
(last visited Jan. 3, 2013); Jill Schachner Chanen, Zombies-at-Law: NY Lawyer Fasci-
nated by the Law's Fascination with Zombies, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2012, available at http://
www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/zombies-at-law-ny-1awyer-fascinated-by-the
laws fascination-withzombies/.
25. See, e.g., Judith Fox, Do We Have a Debt Collection Crisis? Some Cautionary
Tales of Debt Collection in Indiana, 24 Lov. CONSUMER L. REV. 355 (2011-12) (stud-
ying forum shopping by national collection firms in Indiana); Haneman, supra note 24
(discussing the ethical issues involved in seeking default judgments against consumers
for time-barred debts); Holland, supra note 24 (addressing the problems of robo-sign-
ing by debt buyers in small-claims-court actions); Mary Spector, Debts, Defaults and
Details: Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection Litigation on Consumers and Courts,
6 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 257 (2011-12) (studying the role of debt buyers in collection
cases in more than 500 Dallas County court cases); Connor P. Duffy, Note, A Sum
Uncertain: Preserving Due Process and Preventing Default Judgments In Consumer
Debt Buyer Lawsuits in New York, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1147 (2012-13) (address-
ing the problem of inappropriate default judgments obtained by debt buyers in New
York); Eric Y. Wu, Note, Vigilante Justice: Ensuring That Consumer Credit Plaintiffs
Are Not Above The Law In Collins Financial Services v. Vigilante, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
1561 (2010-11) (discussing the need for more documentation in default judgment
matters). Some scholarship has addressed zombie-debt concerns at the pre-litigation
level. See, e.g. Dalid Jim6nez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, (Working Paper, Mar. 4,
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2250784 (argu-
ing that debt collectors who collect on purchased debts that are sold without adequate
warranties, representations, or documentation may violate the FDCPA); Timothy E.
Goldsmith & Nathalie Martin, Testing Materiality Under The Unfair Practices Acts:
What Information Matters When Collecting Time-Barred Debts?, 64 CONSUMER FIN.
L. Q. REP. 372 ( 2010) (identifying the results of a study addressing whether consum-
ers would pay time-barred debts if they were informed that such debts were not en-
forceable); Walgenkim, supra note 24 (suggesting that zombie-debt problems are
created by debt collectors who incorrectly identify themselves as creditors under the
federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the "FDCPA")).
26. See Walgenkim, supra note 24, at 90.
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United States, and the rapid growth of the debt-buying industry. Part II
discusses how consumers can assert that their disputed debts are in fact
dead debts. Part III then discusses the resurrection of dead debts to zom-
bie debts, and the impact of debt buyers on this transformation.
The Article then discusses methods to prevent the growth of zombie
debts. Part IV identifies the failure of traditional federal and state efforts
to prevent the proliferation of zombie-debt collection. Finally, Part V
presents a general framework and specific suggestions to combat zombie
debt.
I. THE GROWTH OF THE DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY
Over the past three decades, consumer debt has grown to staggering
levels. From 1980 to 1995, consumer debt in the United States grew from
approximately $350 billion to $1.1 trillion.27 Since 1995, outstanding con-
sumer debt has more than doubled.28 From 1980 to 2011, consumer debt
increased more than 60 percent faster than average income.2 9 According
to the Federal Reserve, outstanding consumer debt in the United States
in 2012 was over $2.7 trillion, reflecting an average of nearly $8,800 for
every American resident.30 Actual consumer debt is higher because these
figures do not include debt secured by real estate.3 1
The Federal Reserve further divides consumer debt into revolving
and non-revolving debt. Non-revolving debt includes student and vehicle
loans, and may be secured or unsecured.32 Credit-card debt is the primary
component of revolving debt.33 Although revolving debt has dropped
27. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., HISTORICAL DATA FOR
CONSUMER CREDIT OUTSTANDING (LEVELS), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/
gl9/HIST/cc hist salevels.html (last updated Mar. 7, 2014).
28. Rick Jurgens & Robert J. Hobbs, The Debt Machine, How the Collection In-
dustry Hounds Consumers and Overwhelms Courts, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., 5
(July 2010) [hereinafter The Debt Machine], available at www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-
reports/debt-machine.pdf.
29. Consumer Debt Statistics, MONEY-ZINE, http://www.money-zine.com/Finan-
cial-Planning/Debt-Consolidation/Consumer-Debt-Statistics/ (last visited Jun. 20,
2013) (relying on data from the Federal Reserve Board).
30. Id.; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., CONSUMER CREDIT-
G.19, CURRENT RELEASE-JAN. 2014, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/
Current/ (reflecting total outstanding consumer debt for 2012 at over $2.9 trillion)
(last updated Feb. 7, 2014).
31. Consumer Debt Statistics, supra note 29; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE Sys., supra note 30, at n.1.
32. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., supra note 30 at n.3.
33. Glenn B. Canner & Gregory Elliehausen, Consumer Experiences with Credit
Cards, FED. RESERVE BULLETIN, Dec. 2013, at 1, available at http://www.feder-
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from a high of $1 trillion in 2008 to approximately $850 billion in 2012, it
accounts for about one-third of the total outstanding consumer debt.3 4
About 75 percent of American families own at least one credit card." The
average credit-card debt per household is approximately $7,400, with
cardholders having an average of eight cards. 6
Growth in the debt-collection industry has mirrored the dramatic
increase in consumer debts." Since the 1970s, jobs in the collection indus-
try have more than quadrupled, and inflation-adjusted revenue for the
industry has increased by more than six times." It is estimated that one
billion to four billion collection calls are made each year.3 ' Fourteen per-
cent of Americans-nearly thirty million individuals-receive these
calls.40
The development of the debt-buying industry has dramatically
changed the collection business.4 1 The industry has emerged as one of
"the fastest-growing sectors of all financial services."42 It includes compa-
alreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2013/pdf/consumer-experiences-with-credit-cards-201312.
pdf.
34. Consumer Debt Statistics, supra note 29; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE Sys., supra note 30.
35. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU 44 (Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://files.consumer
finance.gov/f/2012/01/Congressional-Report-Jan20l2.pdf [hereinafter CFPB SEMI-
ANNUAL REPORT].
36. Credit Card Debt Statistics, MONEY-ZINE, http://www.money-zine.com/Finan-
cial-Planning/Debt-Consolidation/Credit-Card-Debt-Statistics (Dec. 2013) (relying on
data from the Federal Reserve Board).
37. See Mary Spector, Litigating Consumer Debt Collection: A Study, 31 No. 6
BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL'Y REPORT 1, 2 (2012); Holland, supra note 24, at 264.
38. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHAL-
LENGES OF CHANGE, A WORKSHOP REPORT 13 (2009), available at http://ftc.gov/bcpl
workshops/debtcollection/dcwr.pdf [hereinafter FTC WORKSHOP].
39. Caroline E. Mayer, As Debt Collectors Multiply, So Do Consumer Com-
plaints, WASH. PosT, July 28, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/07/27/AR2005072702473.html (explaining that the typical collector makes
over 40,000 calls per year); see Jurgens & Hobbs, supra note 28, at 5.
40. See Patrick Lunsford, Americans with an Account in Third Party Collections
Hits All-Time High . . . Again, INSIDEARM.com (May 15, 2013), http://www.inside
arm.com/daily/banks-and-credit-grantors/auto-finance-receivables/americans-with-an-
account-in-third-party-collections-hits-all-time-high-again/; CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 8
(2013), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpbMarchFDCPA_
Reportl.pdf [hereinafter CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT].
41. See FTC WORKSHOP, supra note 38, at iv.
42. Holland, supra note 24, at 265.
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nies that buy charged-off debts at deep discounts from creditors and
resellers.43
The modern debt-buying industry evolved from the savings and loan
crisis of the late 1980s." Responding to the crisis, Congress created the
Resolution Trust Corporation to handle the sale of the assets of insolvent
institutions.4 5 Purchasers realized that they could profit by buying and col-
lecting on debts originally owned by these failed institutions.46 They soon
recognized that solvent lenders were also eager to sell off debts at deep
discounts.4 7
In the late 1990s, the influx of institutional investors sparked growth
in the debt-buying industry.4 8 To achieve economies of scale, companies
began to buy and collect on larger portfolios of bad debt. An increase in
consumer spending and merchants' desire to avoid debt collection cre-
ated an "astronomical growth" in the purchasing of debts.49 From 1993 to
2005 the amount of purchased debt rose nearly twenty-fold, from $6 bil-
lion to over $110 billion.5 1 Sales of credit-card debt accounted for about
90 percent of the purchased debt.5 1 In 1996, only about a dozen debt-
buying firms existed.52 Currently, over 500 privately owned companies, as
well as at least four publicly traded companies, are debt buyers.
43. See FTC WORKSHOP, supra note 38, at 3-4.
44. Debt Deception: How Debt Buyers Abuse the Legal System to Prey on Lower-
Income New Yorkers, NEIGHBORHOOD ECON. DEV. ADVOCACY PROJECT, 3 (May
2010), http://www.nedap.org/pressroom/documents/DEBTDECEPTIONFINAL
WEB.pdf [hereinafter Debt Deception].
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.; Goldberg, supra note 24, at 725 (identifying the federal government's sale
of debts of distressed banks and Bank of America's sale of old credit-card debt as the
"key transactions stimulat[ing] a revolution of the debt-collection industry").
48. See Haneman, supra note 24, at 715-16; Goldberg, supra note 24, at 725-26.
49. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 726-28. As consumers took on more debt, espe-
cially in the form of credit-card debt, creditors had more debt to sell. FED. TRADE
COMM'N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING INDUS. 12-13
(2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2013/01/debtbuyingreport.pdf [hereinafter
FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY].
50. See Jurgens & Hobbs, supra note 28, at 18.
51. Debt Deception, supra note 44, at 3.
52. Mayer, supra note 39.
53. Id.; Debt Deception, supra note 44, at 4; U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
FICE, GAO-09-748, CREDIT CARDS: FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT COULD
BETTER REFLECT THE EVOLVING DEBT COLLECTION MARKETPLACE AND USE OF
TECHNOLOGY 7 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09748.pdf [herein-
after GAO Report], cited in FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM:
PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION at 5
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
The debt-collection industry also contributes to overall economic
growth. In 2010, collectors recovered nearly $55 billion in total debt.54
The payroll estimates of the industry, which employs over 300,000," is
over $10 billion, with tax revenues of nearly $2 billion." Forecasts suggest
that job opportunities in the collection industry will grow at a rate faster
than any other industry.57 The industry is expected to exceed $500 billion
in collections and create more than a million jobs in the United States
over the next ten years.
Although the collection industry benefits the economy, an increase
in consumer complaints has accompanied the development of the debt-
buying industry. In 2011, consumers filed more than 140,000 complaints
with the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") against third party and in-
house debt collectors. 59 The industry is the leader in complaints received
n.10 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf [here-
inafter FTC Broken System].
54. ERNST & YOUNG LLP, THE IMPACT OF THIRD-PARTY DEBT COLLECTION ON
THE NATIONAL AND STATE ECONOMIEs 2 (2012), available at http://www.acainterna-
tional.org/files.aspx?p=/images/21594/2011acaeconomicimpactreport.pdf [hereinafter
EY REPORT] (reporting on study of collection agencies commissioned by ACA Inter-
national, the Association of Credit and Collection Professionals). As with other indus-
tries, the recession has reduced profits from debt collection. See Richard M.
Alderman, The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Meets Arbitration: Non-parties and
Arbitration, 24 Lov. CONSUMER L. REV. 586, 588 n.12 (2011-12) (citing Patrick Lun-
sford, The Myth of the Debt Collection Boom, FORBES, Feb. 23, 2012, http://www.
forbes.com/sites/insidearm/2012/02/23/the-myth-of-the-debt-collection-boom/).
55. See Alderman, supra note 54, at 588 (citing Collections Information, ACA
INT'L, http://www.acainternational.org/products-collections-information-5431.aspx
(last visited Oct. 31, 2013)).
56. See EY REPORT, supra note 54, at 2-3.
57. Fox,supra note 25, at 358 (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics estimating growth
rates for the period 2008 to 2018).
58. Martin Sher, On the Clock, COLLECTOR, Sept. 2010, at 9, available at http://
www.digital-collector.com/collectormagazine/201009#pgl 1.
59. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES
AcT: CFPB ANNUAL REPORT 2012 6 (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/201203-efpbFDCPA-annual-report.pdf [hereinafter CFPB 2012 ANNUAL RE-
PORT]. In 2012, direct complaints to the FTC about collectors decreased to about
125,000; however, debt collection still ranked as the top industry target for consumer
complaints. CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 14. Additionally, the Con-
sumer Sentinel Network ("CSN") reported the FTC and entities that partner with the
FTC received more consumer complaints in 2012 than in 2011. Id. at 14 n.13 (citing
FED. TRADE COMM'N, CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR JAN.-DEC.
2012 6, 81 (2013)), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sentinel/reports/sentinel-annual-
reports/sentinel-cy2012.pdf [hereinafter 2012 CSN REPORT]). For more information
about the CSN, see infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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by the FTC and the CFPB." Approximately 25 percent of all complaints
received by the FTC relate to the debt-collection industry.61 The FTC
concedes that the reported numbers may underestimate the total number
of complaints, as they are limited to complaints filed with the FTC.62 The
numbers do not include complaints made to debt collectors, the original
creditor, or other agencies.63 The FTC report further underestimates com-
plaints against collectors because it does not include identity theft or "Do
Not Call" Registry complaints.'
Additionally, through its Consumer Sentinel Network ("CSN"), the
FTC maintains an online database of over eight million consumer com-
plaints collected since 2008." The database is accessible by federal, state,
and local law enforcement authorities, and includes complaints received
by the FTC, the CFPB, other federal agencies, state organizations, and
60. CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 14. The CFPB, which was
created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010, identifies collecting consumer complaints as one of its core functions. The CFPB
began collecting credit-card consumer complaints in 2011; however, the Bureau has
since expanded its scope to include mortgage complaints, bank products and services,
and a variety of loans. Learn About the Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2013); Andrew G.
Berg et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau - The New Sheriff in Town,
NAT'L LAw REVIEw (July 16, 2012), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-new-sheriff-town. Similarly, the Better Business Bureau
reported that the debt-collection industry ranked fifth in its 2010 list of the most com-
plained about industries. BETTER BUS. BUREAU, THEY DEAL IN BILLIONs 1 (2011),
available at http://stlouis.bbb.org/Storage/142/Documents/Bill %20Collector%20Study
%20(FINAL%20WITH%20CHANGES)%2012%2027%202011.pdf [hereinafter
BBB STUDY].
61. See CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 14.
62. Id. at 12. On the other hand, the FTC recognizes that not all complaints are
violations of the FDCPA. Id. at 12-13.
63. Id. at 13; see Jurgens & Hobbs, supra note 28, at 7. In July 2011, the CFPB
established a method to make the reporting of consumer complaints easier. It was
initially established for credit-card complaints and has now been extended to cover
consumer complaints about mortgages, bank products, student loans, and other con-
sumer loans. CFPB 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 5. In June 2012, the
CFPB released an overview and analysis of its program for the time period July 21,
2011 to June 1, 2012. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE: A
SNAPSHOT OF COMPLAINTS RECEIVED (2012), available at http://files.consumerfinance
.gov/f/201206_cfpb shapshot-complaints-received.pdf-. The report identifies billing
disputes as the top credit-card complaint. Id. at 4.
64. See CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 14 n.12. For a discussion
of identity theft issues, see infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text.
65. 2012 CSN REPORT, supra note 59, at 3. Data has been collected since 1997;
however, complaints that are more than five years old are removed from the
database. Id. at 2. The database is available at http://www.ftc.gov/sentinel/.
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non-governmental organizations including the Council of Better Business
Bureaus.' In 2012, the CSN received more than two million complaints.67
The FTC divided these complaints into thirty categories." Identity theft
and debt-collection complaints ranked as the top two categories, account-
ing for 28 percent of all complaints received."
A common complaint against collectors is their pursuit of debts that
are not legally enforceable against consumers." These "dead" debts are
the subject the next section.
II. DEAD DEBTS-DEFENSES FOR CONSUMERS
Just as in horror flicks in which the source of a zombie is a dead
person,7 the source of zombie debt is a dead debt. These unenforceable
debts typically fall into one of three categories: (1) debts that never ex-
isted; (2) debts that have been satisfied by payment, settlement, or dis-
charge in bankruptcy; and (3) time-barred debts.
A. Dead Debts-Debts that Never Existed
"It's not my account" should be a straightforward defense in a col-
lection matter; however, some collectors continue their efforts, even after
receiving evidence that they are contacting individuals who did not incur
66. Id. at 2. The Council of Better Business Bureaus includes all of the North
American Better Business Bureaus. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 3. Identity theft received 18 percent of the overall complaints while debt
collection received 10 percent of the overall complaints. Id.
70. In 2013, the top complaint against debt collectors (one-third of the total re-
ceived) concerned attempts to recover debts that were not owed. CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2014), available at
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/f/201403_cfpb-consumer-response-annual-report-
complaints.pdf. Similarly, complaints that collectors were seeking to recover debts
that were either inflated or not owed were the number one complaint against collec-
tors in 2012 and the second ranked complaint against collectors in 2008-2011. See
CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 17. The percentage of overall com-
plaints in this category increased from approximately 30 percent in 2010 to nearly 40
percent in 2011. See CFPB 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 59, at 8 & app. C.
Similarly, a Better Business Bureau study found that more than 50 percent of com-
plainants claimed that collectors contacted them about debt that they did not owe.
BBB STUDY, supra note 60, at 3.
71. See supra note 4.
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the debts in question.7 2 Media sources call the process of seeking to re-
cover debts against the wrong person as "debt tagging," because collec-
tors will pin the debts of others on innocent consumers. Two primary
reasons for dead-debt issues are mistaken identity and identity theft, as
described below.
1. Mistaken Identity
Unfortunately, collectors often seek recovery from the wrong peo-
ple.74 Despite protests from individuals that they are not the actual debt-
ors, collectors continue to call and send demand letters." The mistaken
identity defense is an assertion that the collector is pursuing the wrong
person because of some clerical error-typically in name, address, or
phone number.76
For example, in Johnson v. Bullhead Investments., LLC," Elaine
Annette Johnson alleged that for several years Bullhead Investments,
LLC, a collector for First USA Bank, pursued her for a debt that be-
longed to Elaine E. Johnson.78 Despite her many statements to Bullhead
and its counsel that the debt was not hers, that she never had an account
72. Sergei Lemberg, Debt Collection and Mistaken Identity, COLLECTION AGENCY
MEDIA (Oct. 15, 2013), http://collectionagencymedia.com/articles/debt-collection-
and-mistaken-identity/.
73. Elisabeth Leamy, 10 Tactics to Stop Rogue Debt Collectors in Their Tracks
ABC NEWS (Apr. 26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/10-tactics-stop-rogue-
debt-collectors-tracks/story?id=16220825; Debt Tagging: When You Get Tagged with
Someone Else's Debt, NEWSLETTER (Identity Theft 911, Scottsdale, Ariz.), May 2010,
at 1, 3.; Kathy M. Kristof, When Debt Collectors Go After the Wrong Person, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/19/business/la-fi-perfin-
20101219; Sonja Ryst, 'Debt Tagging' by Collection Agencies a Growing Problem,
WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/08/06/AR2010080606237.html.
74. Lemberg, supra note 72 ("It may seem like a stretch, but debt collectors rou-
tinely go after the wrong person and wreak havoc on their personal finances."); see,
e.g, Bodur v. Palisades Collection, LLC, 829 F. Supp. 2d 246, 247-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
75. Bodur, 829 F. Supp. 2d at 248 (alleging that even though the collector knew
that Ibrahim Bodur was not the actual debtor, the collector continued to send de-
mands for payment of debts to Ibrahim Bodur, an individual who had a different
Social Security number and address than the actual debtor).
76. Leamy, supra note 73; Kristof, supra note 73.
77. Johnson v. Bullhead Invs., LLC, No. 1:09CV639, 2010 WL 118274 (M.D.N.C.
Jan. 11, 2010) (involving a hearing before the magistrate judge on the issue of whether
Johnson's complaint alleging that Bullhead Investments, Inc. and its counsel, Brock &
Scott, PLLC, violated the FDCPA should be dismissed, or alternatively that certain
paragraphs of the complaint be struck). The judge denied the motion to strike and
recommended that the court deny the motion to dismiss. Id. at *7.
78. Id. at *1.
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with First USA, that she was not Elaine E. Johnson, and that she did not
know Elaine E. Johnson, the collectors continued to pursue the claim.79
Even after Bullhead removed her from its mailing list and had been pro-
vided proof that she had a different Social Security number, Bullhead's
attorneys served her with a summons and complaint seeking recovery on
the First USA debt.' Ms. Johnson then sent additional evidence to Bull-
head's attorneys that she never lived in Ohio where the alleged debt
arose." Bullhead's attorneys refused to release the claim unless she
proved that she was not Elaine E. Johnson by filing an affidavit that fraud
had occurred.82 Unaware of any fraud, she refused to file a false affida-
vit." Eventually, Elaine A. Johnson hired counsel and was successful in
her motion for summary judgment on the basis that she and Elaine E.
Johnson were different people."
In other cases, the FTC has filed complaints against collectors for
knowingly pursuing claims against individuals who did not incur the al-
leged debts." For example, in United States v. Asset Acceptance, LLC,86
the FTC alleged that Asset Acceptance, a debt purchaser and collector,
knew that the portfolio of debts it acquired from Bally Total Fitness con-
tained unreliable data, including inaccurate or missing Social Security
numbers.8 1 Consequently, Asset Acceptance tried to collect from individ-
uals who did not have any agreement with Bally Total Fitness." In Janu-
ary 2012, Asset Acceptance agreed to pay a penalty of $2.5 million to
settle the claim." Additionally, in July 2013, Expert Global Solutions and
its subsidiaries, who represent the world's largest debt-collection opera-
79. Id.
80. Id. at *1-2.
81. Id. at *2.
82. Id.
83. Johnson, 2010 WL 118274, at *2.
84. Id.
85. Amended Complaint for Injunctive & Other Equitable Relief at 7, Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt. Corp., No. 04-C7781 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11,
2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/camco/050411camcoamendedcom-
plaint.pdf; Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunctive and Other Relief at 8-10, 16-18,
United States v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, No. 8:12-cv-00182-T-27EAJ (M.D. Fla. Jan.
30, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523133/120130assetcmpt.pdf.
86. United States v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, No. 8:12-cv-00182-T-27EAJ (M.D.
Fla. Jan. 30, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523133/120130asset
cmpt.pdf.
87. Id. at 16.
88. Id. at 16-18.
89. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Under FTC Settlement, Debt Buyer
Agrees to Pay $2.5 Million for Alleged Consumer Deception (Jan. 30, 2012), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/01/asset.shtm.
[Vol. 44340
Summer 2014] PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM ZOMBIE-DEBT COLLECTORS 341
tion, agreed to settle FTC claims that included allegations that collectors
continued to call consumers even after consumers denied owing debts."
The settlement included a record payment of $3.2 million by Expert
Global Solutions.91
2. Identity Theft
In contrast to the defense of mistaken identity, identity theft in-
volves allegations of fraud. It "occurs when a person steals another per-
son's name, address, [S]ocial [S]ecurity number, or other identifying
information in order to commit fraud."' In other words, consumers ac-
knowledge debts in their name, but argue that they should not be liable
for the debts because identity theft was the source of the debts.
Identity theft is a significant problem. The Identity Theft and As-
sumption Deterrence Act ("ITADA")93 of 1998 was the "first comprehen-
sive effort to rewrite the federal criminal code to address the effects of
identity theft on individuals."94 The ITADA directed the FTC to keep
records of identity-theft complaints.95 Identity-theft claims have contin-
ued to rise. In 2001, the FTC reported that consumers had filed 86,000
identity-theft complaints. In 2012, the number of complaints had in-
creased to about 370,000,96 and the FTC recognized identity theft to be
the leading complaint for the thirteenth consecutive year.97
90. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, World's Largest Debt Collection Opera-
tion Settles FTC Charges, Will Pay $3.2 Million Penalty (July 9, 2013), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/07/nco.shtm.
91. Id.
92. Martha A. Sabol, The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998
Do Individual Victims Finally Get Their Day in Court?, 11 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV.
165, 166 (1998-99). A discussion of the causes and potential solutions for identity
theft is beyond the scope of this article. For more information, see Lori J. Parker,
Annotation, Legal and Procedural Issues in Prosecutions Under Federal Statutes Relat-
ing to Offense of Identity Theft, 4 A.L.R. FED. 2D 365 (2005); Lori J. Parker, Annota-
tion, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes Relating to Offense of
Identity Theft, 125 A.L.R. 5TH 537 (2005). Instead, this article addresses identity theft
in the context of zombie debt-when a debt collector recovers on a debt that the
debtor did not incur, the collector has created a zombie debt.
93. Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-318,
112 Stat. 3007 (1998) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2006)).
94. Erin Leigh Sylvester, Identity Theft: Are the Elderly Targeted?, 3 CONN. Pus.
INT. L.J. 371, 376 (2004).
95. Pub. L. No. 105-318, § 5, 112 Stat. 3007, 3010 (1998); Sylvester, supra note 94,
at 377-79.
96. See 2012 CSN REPORT, supra note 59, at 5, 6.
97. Id.; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Releases Top 10 Complaint Cat-
egories for 2012 (Feb. 26, 2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/02/sentinel
top.shtm.
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More importantly, the number of victims of identity theft far ex-
ceeds the number of filed complaints. According to the Bureau of Jus-
tice's statistics for 2010, more than 8.5 million American households,
roughly 7 percent of households, were victims of identity theft." This rep-
resents an increase from the 5.5 percent of households that were victims
of identity theft in 2005." Misuse of existing credit cards has been the
primary and most rapidly growing source of identity theft, increasing
from 3.6 million (or about 56 percent of victimized households) in 2005,
to 5.5 million (or about 64 percent of victimized households) in 2010."
The elderly are particularly vulnerable to this crime."o'
Victims of identity theft not only deal with the demands from collec-
tors who seek to recover the debts, but may also suffer emotional harm,
and may spend hundreds of hours trying to repair their credit histories
and reputations.10 2 In 2010, the total economic loss of households due to
identity theft exceeded $13.2 billion.03 In summary, a dead-debt defense
exists when a consumer never incurred the debt and the collector pursues
the debt either because of improper or fraudulent information.
B. Dead Debts-Debts that Have Been Satisfied
"I no longer owe the debt" or "the debt has been taken care of" is
another common defense to a debt claim. As discussed below, this de-
fense is relevant (a) when an account has been settled or paid, or (b)
when a bankruptcy proceeding has discharged the debt.
1. Paid or Settled Debts
A debt is extinguished if the debtor has paid it in full or the parties
have agreed to release the borrower's obligation for less than full pay-
ment. The defenses in this category include payment, release, settlement
and accord, and satisfaction." Although there may be disputes about
98. Lynn Langton, Identity Theft Reported by Households, 2005-2010, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, 1 (Nov. 2011), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/itrh0510.pdf.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2.
101. Sylvester, supra note 94, at 371.
102. Id. at 373-74; R. Bradley McMahon, Note, After Billions Spent to Comply
with HIPAA and GLBA Privacy Provisions, Why Is Identity Theft the Most Prevalent
Crime in America?, 49 VILL. L. REv. 625, 625-26 (2004).
103. Langton, supra note 98, at 5.
104. A thorough discussion of these defenses is beyond the scope of this article.
For more information, see Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule that
Acceptance of Check Purporting To Be Final Settlement of Disputed Amount Consti-
tutes Accord and Satisfaction, 42 A.L.R. 4TH 12 (1985); Karen S. Harmatiuk, Satisfac-
tion of Debt by Payment of Less than Amount Claimed To Be Due, 35 AM. JUR.
342 [Vol. 44
Summer 2014] PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM ZOMBIE-DEBT COLLECTORS 343
whether any one of these defenses applies, collectors should not be able
to collect on such debts. As with the mistaken-identity and identity-theft
cases, some collectors seek recovery of settled debts.05 For example, in
Overcash v. United Abstract Group, Inc.,'" Chase Bank sold Larry Over-
cash's credit-card debt of $1,353.15 to United Abstract, who in turn sent a
letter to Overcash that the debt was paid in full." Despite this correspon-
dence, the debt was subsequently sold and resold.1" American Credit, the
ultimate purchaser of the account, sought collection from Overcash of
$41,701.58, and reported this amount to the credit bureaus.'" In an action
involving violations under the FDCPA, a court entered judgment against
United Abstract and American Credit for $5,155, which included attor-
neys' fees and statutory damages.10 Similarly, in 2010 the FTC settled a
dispute with Credit Bureau Collection Services, in which the FTC alleged
that the company continued collection efforts against individuals who had
presented evidence of payment or settlement."1 '
2. Debts Discharged in Bankruptcy
Consumers can also discharge debts by filing bankruptcy. The com-
mencement of a bankruptcy case typically stays collection attempts of
PROOF OF FAcrs 2D 735 (1983); R.E.H., Annotation, Trade Acceptance or Unsecured
Note or Bill as Accord and Satisfaction, 62 A.L.R. 751 (1962); G. Van Ingen, Annota-
tion, Payment of Undisputed Amount or Liability as Consideration for Discharge of
Disputed Amount or Liability, 112 A.L.R. 1219 (1938).
105. See Holland, supra note 24, at 270-71 nn.75-79 and accompanying text
(describing cases where collectors have sought recovery on paid or settled debt, in-
cluding a situation where a collector sued on a debt that the collector had already
settled).
106. Overcash v. United Abstract Grp., Inc., 549 F. Supp. 2d 193 (N.D.N.Y. 2008).
107. Id. at 195.
108. Id.
109. Id. The court does not explain the basis for American Credit's pursuit of a
claim of over $40,000 for a debt that was originally for less than $1,500, but the court
states that the conduct was "relatively egregious." Id. at 196.
110. Id. at 197. The judgment entered was a default judgment in which the court
deemed the allegations in Overcash's complaint as true and found that United Ab-
stract and American Credit violated the FDCPA. Id. at 196-97. Final damages were
based on the court's assessment of damages recoverable under the FDCPA, including
attorney's fees and costs. Id.
111. Plaintiff's Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunctive and Other Relief at 4-5,
United States v. Credit Bureau Collection Servs., No.2:10-cv-169 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24,
2010); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Debt Collectors Will Pay More Than $1
Million to Settle FTC Charges (Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opal
2010/03/creditcollect.shtm.
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creditors and collectors.112 The Bankruptcy Code describes the discharge
afforded during different types of bankruptcy proceedings,"' and the ef-
fect of the discharge.' 14 Under § 524, an injunction will generally halt the
collection of all debts except those specifically listed as non-dischargeable
by the Bankruptcy Code or the bankruptcy judge determines to be non-
dischargeable."' When granted, a discharge "operates as an injunction
against the commencement of continuation of an action, the employment
of process, or an act, to collect, recover, or offset any such debt as a per-
sonal liability of the debtor.""' Furthermore, some courts have held that
the injunction applies not only to the collection of discharged debt, but
also to the sale of a discharged debt.'"
Despite this injunction, a market exists for debts discharged in bank-
ruptcy, and debt purchasers do seek collection on such discharged
debts."'
C. Dead Debts-Expiration of Limitation Periods
Unlike the defenses based on an assertion that a debt never existed,
or that it was satisfied, this defense recognizes the existence of the debt,
but asserts that the passage of time creates a dead or non-enforceable
debt. Defenses based on statutory limitation periods have existed for cen-
112. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006). Of course, there are exceptions to the automatic stay,
see 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006 & Supp. 2010); however, the exceptions are beyond the
scope of the issues discussed in this Article.
113. Id. H§ 727 (Chapter 7), 1141 (Chapter 11), 1328 (Chapter 13).
114. Id. § 524.
115. Id. A detailed discussion about the extent and impact of discharge and the
dischargeability of specific debts involved in bankruptcy cases is beyond the scope of
this Article. For more information, see David M. Holliday, Annotation, Willful Viola-
tion of Discharge Injunction Provisions of Bankruptcy Code § 524(a) (2) and (3) (11
U.S.C.A. § 524(a) (2) and (3)) 9 A.L.R. FED. 2D 431 (2006).
116. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2006).
117. See Laboy v. Firstbank P.R. (In re Laboy), Bankr. No. 93-00753, Adv. No.
09-00047, 2010 WL 427780, at *6 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2010); In re Nassoko, 405 B.R. 515,
520-21 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Lafferty, 229 B.R. 707, 713-14 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1998). But see Finnie v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 275 B.R. 743, 746 (E.D. Va.
2002) (holding that sale did not violate discharge injunction); Guy B. Moss, The Risks
of Purchasing and Collecting Consumer Debt, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 643, 663
(2002) (describing Lafferty as stating the minority view).
118. Adam J. Levitin, Bankruptcy Markets: Making Sense Of Claims Trading, 4
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 67,81 (2009); Robert Berner & Brian Grow, Prison-
ers of Debt, Bus. WK. (Nov. 12, 2007), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-1 1-
11/prisoners-of-debt. Two of the top-ten debt buyers purchase only debts of consum-
ers who have filed bankruptcy. See FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 8
n.37; FTC WORKSHOP, supra note 38, at 64-65.
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turies.'19 As recognized by the Supreme Court, "they are found and ap-
proved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence."1 20 They are rooted in
concepts of efficiency and fairness.12 1 They protect the interests of poten-
tial defendants, the courts, and society. Statutes of limitations encourage
plaintiffs to file suits in a timely manner to ensure that evidence and wit-
nesses are still available. They provide certainty for businesses and indi-
viduals against the indefinite threat of lawsuits. 122 In the consumer
context, courts have specifically recognized the unfairness of filing suit
after the limitations period has expired. 23
Although statutes of limitation are bright-line rules barring the en-
forcement of old debts, collectors often pursue time-barred claims. One
commentator has suggested that "time-barred debt is where the worst
abuse has occurred towards the debtor."124 While Mississippi and Wiscon-
sin statutes provide that the passage of a limitations period extinguishes
both the debt and the liability,'25 in the majority of states, the rule is that
the passage of the time extinguishes liability, but not the debt itself.126
Most courts have stated that the FDCPA127 does not prohibit requests for
payments on time-barred debts as long as collectors do not file or
threaten to file lawsuits. 128
119. WILLIAM FERGUSON, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SAVING STATUTES 46
(1978). The characterization of a debt as unenforceable based on the passage of time
does not remove the moral obligation associated with the debt. See Randy Sutton,
Annotation, Moral or Natural Obligation as Consideration for Contract, 98 A.L.R.
5TH 353 (2002).
120. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
121. Haneman, supra note 24, at 710 n.16.
122. Suzette M. Malveaux, Statute of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context
of Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 75-82 (2005) (describing the
policy reasons for limitation periods).
123. See, e.g., Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 (M.D. Ala. 1987)
(recognizing that consumers are typically unaware of limitation defenses and even if
consumers are aware they may refuse to raise the defense based on the time and
expense necessary to appear in court).
124. Andrew Martin, Old Debts that Won't Die, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/07/31/business/31collect.html?pagewanted=all (quoting John
Pratt, a consultant to the debt-buying industry and an author of "Debt Purchasing: An
Investor's Guide to Buying Debt" (Morris Publishing, 2005)).
125. Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-3 (2012); Wis. STAT. § 893.05 (1997); Klewer v. Cav-
alry lnvs., LLC, No. 01-C-541-S, 2002 WL 2018830, at *2-3 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 30, 2002).
126. Haneman, supra note 24, at 717-18.
127. FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2006).
128. See, e.g., Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 33-34 (3d Cir. 2011);
Castro v. Collecto, Inc., 634 F.3d 779, 783 (5th Cir. 2011); Freyermuth v. Credit Bu-
reau Servs., Inc., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2001). But see McMahon v. LVNV Fund-
ing, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that a threat of litigation is not
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Despite prohibitions on threatening or filing lawsuits, collectors con-
tinue to threaten legal action, file lawsuits, and obtain judgments (prima-
rily default judgments) on time-barred debts.129 In the majority of states,
the passage of the limitations period is an affirmative defense that the
defendant must raise. 130 As a practical matter, alleged debtors rarely raise
this defense, since most lawsuits result in default judgments.'31
Unfortunately, dead debts do not always remain dead. As described
below, like the re-animated zombies in the movies, collectors can resur-
rect dead debts to create zombie debts, creating nightmarish situations
for unwitting consumers.132
III. ZOMBIE DEBTS-RESURRECTED DEAD DEBTS
Over the last decade, the number of zombie debts has increased,
and along with it the debt-buying industry has exploded.133 Understanding
the creation and proliferation of these resurrected debts is the first step to
defeating them.
a necessary element for a misrepresentation claim under the FDCPA and recognizing
that its decision conflicts with decisions of the Third and Eighth Circuits); Stepney v.
Outsourcing Solutions, Inc., No. 97 C 5288, 1997 WL 722972, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13,
1997) (explaining petition stated a claim under FDCPA when collector knew it was
collecting on a time-barred debt and letter threatened further collection action); see
also Charles V. Gall, Proceeding with Caution: Collecting Time-Barred Debts, 56 CON-
SUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 244, 245-47 (2002) (discussing how an implicit threat of a
lawsuit may be sufficient for liability).
129. See FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 46. A legal provider in
New York claims that more than half of the actions in its office were based on time-
barred debt. Id. at n.192 (citing to Letter from Robert A. Martin, Assoc. Dir., DC 37
Mun. Emps. Legal Servs., to the FTC (Feb. 11, 2010) (on file with the FTC)). For
scholarship discussing the problems of litigating zombie debts, see supra note 25. This
Article focuses on pre-litigation issues.
130. FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 45; Haneman, supra note 24,
at 729-30; see, e.g., Mass. R. Civ. P. 8 (establishing Massachusetts' rule limitations as
an affirmative defense). Some states are now placing specific restrictions to sanction
collectors who file actions with reason to know that debts are time-barred. See
Spector, supra note 25, at 270-71 (citing to North Carolina law (N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 58-7-115(4) (West 2011)) making it an unfair practice for a debt buyer to sue
on a time-barred debt).
131. See FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 45. For more information
about the prevalence of default judgment in collection matters, see infra notes 173-80
and accompanying text.
132. Forbes, supra note 7.
133. For a discussion of the association between the growth in the debt-buying in-
dustry and the growth in the collection of zombie debts, see infra Part III.B.
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A. Birth of a Zombie Debt
As illustrated by Harry's short horror story at the beginning of this
article, dead debts can come back to life. Partial payments, acknowledge-
ments, new agreements, and judgments are the primary mechanisms for
resurrecting debts.
1. Zombie Debts Created by Debtor's Partial Payment
Typically, the last payment made on an account serves as the start-
ing point for running the period under the statute of limitations.'" After
the statutory period has run, the debt is no longer enforceable in court."'
In most states, however, partial payment after the expiration of the limia-
tions period will revive the debt and restart the clock for limitations.136 As
a result, a collector hoping to revive a time-barred debt may cajole a con-
sumer into making a small payment."' Typically, the collector will not
disclose that she is seeking recovery on a time-barred debt.' Resetting
the limitations period may enable the collector to recover the entire
amount owed as opposed to only the amount of the initial payment.' 9
The difficulty in determining the applicable limitation period com-
pounds the problem for the uninformed consumer.140 For example, what
is the statute of limitation that applies to a Texas resident who purchases
clothing at a department store in Oklahoma by signing up for the
merchant's credit card that a New York bank services? Determining the
appropriate limitation period for an unpaid debt often begins with a com-
plicated choice-of-law analysis. 14' After determining the applicable law,
134. FTC Broken System, supra note 53, at 24; Emily Grace, Out of Statute, COL-
LECTOR, July 2011 at 40, available at http://www.digital-collector.com/collectormaga-
zine/201107#pg42; FED. TRADE COMM'N, CONSUMER INFO., TIME-BARRED DEBTS
(July 2013), available at http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0117-time-barred-debts.
135. See Gall, supra note 128, at 244; Haneman, supra note 24, at 717.
136. See FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 47; FTC Broken System,
supra note 53, at 27; SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 8:31 (4th ed. 2008) (recognizing that "part payment of a barred
debt amounts to a new promise to pay the debt . . . represents a generally accepted
principle"). For collection of cases discussing the issue of how payment revives the
limitation period, see H. A. Wood, Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Identifica-
tion of Part Payment with the Particular Debt in Question, for Purposes of Tolling, or
Removing Bar of Statute of Limitations, 142 A.L.R. 389 (1943).
137. Martin, supra note 124; FTC Broken System, supra note 53, at 27.
138. Id.
139. See Martin, supra note 124.
140. FTC Broken System, supra note 53, at 24.
141. Eli J. Richardson, Eliminating the Limitations of Limitations Law, 29 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1015, 1027 (1997); Dudek v. Thomas & Thomas Attorneys & Counselors at
Law, 702 F. Supp. 2d 826, 834-35 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (discussing choice of law issues).
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the next step is to identify the proper statutory period. Limitation periods
vary between the states, 1 42 and even within a particular state, the charac-
terization of the agreement between the creditor and the debtor can de-
termine the applicable period. 143 For example, should the limitation
period for contracts or sale of goods apply to credit-card debt? 144 Con-
sumer debt typically falls within the following categories: written con-
tract, oral contract, open account, or negotiable instrument.145 Depending
on the state, the limitation period for these categories may vary signifi-
cantly. 1 46 Finally, even after identifying the choice of law and the applica-
ble limitation period, the consumer has to determine when the period
starts, and whether the period has tolled.147 Given the complexity of de-
termining limitation periods, it is not surprising that consumers are typi-
cally unaware of when a given debt becomes time-barred.
Choice of law may depend on a variety of factors including the forum where the
action is filed, the residence of the consumer at the time the action is filed, the resi-
dence of the consumer when the agreement was signed, and the language contained in
the agreement between the consumer and the original creditor. A detailed discussion
of choice of law rules for determining limitation periods is beyond the scope of this
Article, for more information see Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 2011: Twenty-Fifth Annual Survey, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 291, 340-42
(2012) (discussing the different choice of law approaches for determining limitation
periods). Symeonides provides a table that identifies the approaches taken by the
District of Columbia and 49 of the 50 states to limitation conflicts. Id. at 341. Louisi-
ana follows a hybrid approach. Id. at 341 n.240; see also Robert A. Brazener, Annota-
tion, Choice of Law as to Applicable Statute of Limitations in Contract Actions, 78
A.L.R. 3D 639 (1977).
142. Clinton Rooney, Defense of Assigned Consumer Debts, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE
REv. 542, 547 (2010) (describing that state limitation periods may range from under
four years to more than ten years).
143. FTC Broken System, supra note 53, at 24. For a general discussion of the
difficulties in determining limitation periods, see Richardson, supra note 141. As
Richardson describes, "finding the applicable statute and divining the actual deadline
for a claim requires a confusing multi-step analysis." Id. at 1026-27.
144. See Gall, supra note 128, at 248. The determination of the applicable statute
may depend on whether the merchant or a third-party provided financing. Id. (citing
Hamid v. Blatt, No. 00 C 4511, 2001 WL 1035726, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 4, 2001)).
145. Statute of Limitations on Debts, CREDITINFOCENTER.COm (Sept. 3, 2013),
http://www.creditinfocenter.com/rebuild/statuteLimitations.shtml#2.
146. See id. (providing a chart depicting the limitation periods for each state based
on the type of action); Rooney, supra note 142, at 547; see, e.g., Dudek, 702 F. Supp.
2d at 839-40 (identifying that if the debt is characterized as a debt on a written con-
tract Ohio's fifteen-year period applies, while if the debt is treated as a debt on an
oral contract a six-year period applies).
147. See Brazener, supra note 141, at §§ 10-11; Rooney, supra note 142, at 547-48.
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2. Zombie Debts Created by Mere Acknowledgement
In many states, acknowledging a debt-even without payment-can
restart the limitations period.148 For example, in Ferguson v. Ingoldsby,'49
the court found that, under Virginia law, a debtor's e-mail reply to a cred-
itor was sufficient to qualify as an acknowledgement, reviving an other-
wise time-barred debt.so The creditor had e-mailed the following
statement to the debtor-"[i]t is now time to take this loan seriously and
make arrangements to repay us, with interest, immediately.""' The
debtor responded-"[w]e cannot have a repayment plan if we do not talk.
Give me a time on Tuesday and we will get a firm repayment plan in
place."l52 The court held that the debtor's response acknowledged the
debt and indicated a willingness to repay, thereby reviving the otherwise
dead debt."' Some argue that a debtor's moral obligation to repay justi-
fies enforcing a debt after it has been acknowledged.'54
Given the impact of the acknowledgement on a time-barred debt, a
collector may attempt to get the consumer to recognize the existence of a
debt without disclosing that the limitation period has run."' One such
technique is to include detachable return stubs in demand letters.'5 ' The
stub will offer the consumer different options for payment terms. When a
consumer returns the stub even without any payment, the consumer may
have acknowledged the debt, and thereby revived an otherwise dead
debt.'
Although the general rule is that acknowledgements need not be in
writing unless required by statute, most states have adopted provisions
requiring a writing to support an acknowledgement."'
148. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 750; 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 291
(2012).
149. Ferguson v. Ingoldsby, No. 1:09cv739, 2009 WL 3763676 (E.D. Va. Nov. 5,
2009).
150. Id. at *4.
151. Id. at *3.
152. Id.
153. Id. at *4.
154. HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 5:17 (2012).
155. Richard Rubin, FDCPA Claims Arising Out of State Court Collection Litiga-
tion, THE CONSUMER ADVOCATE, July-Aug.-Sept. 2008, at 19 n.22. The process of




158. See WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 136, at § 8:26.
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
3. Zombie Debts Created by "New" Settlement Agreements
A collector may also revive a dead debt by offering a settlement that
will replace the alleged debt.'15 The settled amount becomes a new debt
that is enforceable against the consumer, even though the underlying
debt may have been unenforceable." Collectors may use the promise of
additional credit as a method of reviving dead debts. The collector will.
offer to roll the old debt (or some fraction of it) into a new credit-card
debt. This "new" debt will now be enforceable against the consumer,
even if the underlying debt was previously unenforceable. 6 '
Similarly, consumers may agree to pay unenforceable debts in order
to clean their credit reports.'62 Often consumers first become aware of
dead debts when they try to secure financing of homes or vehicles and are
typically under a time pressure to close their deals.163 Attempts to get the
debts quickly removed from their credit reports, however, are usually not
successful. Collectors may ignore, or deny consumers' requests to clear
up their credit reports, and instead try to recover these debts.'" Conse-
quently, creditors pressure consumers to pay unenforceable debts, and
consumers may end up paying for fear that they will not be able to obtain
financing.165
A related issue is the re-aging of consumer debts. Under the Fair
Credit Reporting Act,166 collectors reporting to credit bureaus are re-
quired to provide the actual month and year when an account became
delinquent.167 This delinquency date determines the seven-year period
during which information on a disputed debt remains on a consumer's
credit report.168 Accordingly, even if limitation periods have expired,
debts may remain on consumers' credit reports for seven years and would
negatively affect their ability to secure a loan or a credit line. This creates
159. Cf Weston, supra note 1.
160. Cf id.
161. Carolyn Carter, Elizabeth Renuart, Margot Saunders & Chi Chi Wu, The
Credit Card Market and Regulation: In Need of Repair, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 23, 45
(2006).
162. See, e.g., Berner & Grow, supra note 118 (describing scenarios where consum-
ers seeking to obtain home loans agreed to pay debts that were discharged in bank-
ruptcy but still appeared on their credit reports).
163. See id.
164. Id. (explaining some debt buyers may even change account numbers reported
to credit bureaus, making it even more difficult to clean the credit report of dis-
charged debt).
165. Id.; Levitin, supra note 118, at 81 n.65.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681x (2006).
167. Id. § 1681s-2(a)(5)(A).
168. See Weston, supra note 1.
350 [Vol. 44
Summer 2014] PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM ZOMBIE-DEBT COLLECTORS 351
an incentive for consumers to pay debts that would otherwise be
unenforceable.169
Collectors, in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act may re-age
debts by submitting new delinquency dates that are later than the actual
delinquency dates."o This allows the debt to remain on the consumer's
credit report beyond the seven-year period from actual delinquency.' In
2004, NCO Financial Systems, Inc., one of the nation's largest debt-col-
lection firms, agreed to pay $1.5 million to settle FTC's claims that it had
improperly re-aged debts.17 2
4. Zombie Debts Created by Judgments Arising from Collection
Suits
Scholarship has started to examine how collectors have improperly
used the court system to convert dead debts to enforceable judgments."
Debt-collection suits represent a substantial portion of suits filed in state
courts. In many courts, more than half of the civil cases filed are collec-
tion matters.174 Default judgments in these cases are common, composing
sixty to ninety-five percent of collection efforts.' 5 The failure to respond
169. Rebecca Lake, Should I Pay on a Time-Barred Debt?, EHow.com, http://www.
ehow.com/way_5743982_should-pay-time-barred-debt_.html (last visited July 22,
2013).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(1) (2006); see Rex C. Anderson, Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act A Law Needing Updating?, MICH. B.J., Sept. 2010, at 29.
171. Rex C. Anderson, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act A Law Needing Updat-
ing?, MICH. B.J., Sept. 2010, at 29; Donald Petersen, Night of the Living Debt,
FDCPA.ME (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.fdcpa.me/night-of-the-living-debt/; Weston,
supra note 1.
172. Consent Decree, United States v. NCO Grp., Inc., No. 04-2041 (E.D. Pa. May
13, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/9923012/040513ncoco9923012.pdf.
At the time, this was the largest civil penalty imposed under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, NCO Group to Pay Largest FCRA Civil
Penalty to Date (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2004/05/nco-group-pay-largest-fcra-civil-penalty-date.
173. This Article focuses on pre-litigation issues. For scholarship that has addressed
methods of dealing with zombie debt that occur with the onset of litigation, see supra
note 25 and accompanying text.
174. FTC WORKSHOP, supra note 38, at 55.
175. FTC Broken System, supra note 53, at 7; Haneman, supra note 24, at 717
(stating "[c]onservative estimates suggest that 70% to 90% of debt collection lawsuits
brought against unrepresented defendants result in default judgments."); FTC WORK-
SHOP, supra note 38, at 57 (stating "[p]erhaps the most significant issue related to debt
collection litigation is the prevalence of default judgments"). An examination of a 365
case sample from over 450,000 lawsuits filed by 26 debt buyers in New York Civil
Court from January 2006 through July 2008 found that only 10 percent of defendants
filed an answer. Debt Deception, supra note 44, at 1.
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may be due to a variety of factors including failing to receive the notice,
failing to understand the notice, or fearing the potential time and costs
involved in litigation.176 Studies have shown that in many of these cases,
consumers had defenses, including the dead-debt defenses described in
Part II."
Judgments "give new life" to dead debts, and allow collectors to
seek collection on new obligations backed by a court order."1 8 Judgments
may be enforceable for ten years or longer.'79 Judgments give collectors
new and more powerful methods to obtain recovery, including garnish-
ment, judgment liens, turnover, and receivership orders.
B. The Growth of Zombie Debts and the Rise in the Number of
Zombie-Debt Buyers- Underlying Reasons
Unrestricted sales of consumer debt have also contributed to the
growth in zombie debts. The growth of the debt-buying industry has been
176. Debt Deception, supra note 44, at 1; FFC Broken System, supra note 53, at 7.
Default judgments are particularly disturbing when consumers are not provided
proper notice of collection suits or default judgment hearings. Debt Deception, supra
note 44, at 6. This may even be the result of an intentional failure to serve consumers.
The practice where process servers file false affidavits claiming that service was made
even though papers have never been served has been dubbed "sewer service." Id.;
FTC Broken System, supra note 53, at 8 n.22. See APPLESEED, DUE PROCESS AND
CONSUMER DEBT: ELIMINATING BARRIERS TO JUSTICE IN CONSUMER CREDIT CASES
10-13 (2010), available at http://appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/
Due-Process-and-Consumer-Debt.pdf [hereinafter APPLESEED REPORT] (describing
the sewer service problem in New York).
177. See Spector, supra note 25, at 272. The author refers to one study showing that
in more than half the cases, consumers had good-faith defenses to collection. Id. A
study of 365 cases filed by debt buyers in New York City found that 35 percent of the
cases were clearly meritless. Debt Deception, supra note 44, at 2. Additionally, one
New York legal service provider claims that at least half of the collection actions in its
office were based on time-barred debts. Letter from Robert A. Martin to FTC, supra
note 129.
178. See Haneman, supra note 24, at 710.
179. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-114 (West 2005) (showing Arkansas's ten-
year period); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 211 (Consol. 2012) (showing New York's twenty-year pe-
riod). A judgment may also be revived for additional time. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-65-501 (West Supp. 2011) (establishing a procedure for using scire facias to revive
the judgment for another ten years).
180. The Debt Collection Racket in New York, NEw ECONOMY PROJECT, 1 (June
2013), http://www.nedap.org/resources/documents/DebtCollectionRacketNY.pdf
[hereinafter Debt Collection Racket]; Debt Deception, supra note 44, at 1; FTC Bro-
ken System, supra note 53, at 6; FTC WORKSHOP, supra note 38, at 57 n.344. Unless
the consumer can demonstrate that the judgment was improperly obtained, she may
be precluded from challenging the underlying debt obtained by a default judgment.
FTC WORKSHOP, supra note 38, at 57 n.344.
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associated with an increase in the number of consumer complaints against
collectors, including complaints related to the collection of zombie
debts.'"' Although concerns related to issues raised by zombie debts ex-
isted in the 1970s,1" the term "zombie debt" did not gain popular atten-
tion until after the rapid growth of the debt-buying industry. 18 3 As
described below, possible reasons for the growth of zombie-debt collec-
tion accompanying the development of the debt-buying industry are in-
sufficient and inaccurate information received by debt buyers during the
sale of charged-off debts; the motivations of debt buyers; and competitive
forces in the industry.
1. Insufficient and Inaccurate Information Provided by Sellers to
Debts Buyers-Impact on the Collection of Zombie Debts
During a debt sale, buyers often receive insufficient and inaccurate
information about the debts they purchase. As a result, it is not too sur-
prising that buyers pursue debts that may be time-barred, already paid
for by debtors, discharged in bankruptcy, or misidentified." To better
explain the increase in complaints that accompanies the collection of
zombie debts, the sale process is described below.
Typically, sellers will try to collect debts before charging them off
and putting them up for sale. A seller will bundle these "bad" debts into
large portfolios so that even though the debts sell at deep discounts, the
amount it receives from the sale of a large portfolio is substantial.' Buy-
ers may then resell charged-off debts several times.1 6 By one estimate, as
much as fifty percent of purchased credit-card debt is resold.'
181. See Debt Collection Racket, supra note 180, at 1.
182. The topic of collectors seeking recovery on debts that were not owed or were
time-barred was part of the mid-1970s legislative history of the FDCPA. See infra
notes 256-62 and accompanying text.
183. Amy Fontinelle, Beware of Zombie Debt Collectors, FORBES.COm (Oct. 31,
2008), http://www.forbes.com/2008/10/31/debt-creditors-default-pf-education-in-af
1031 investopediajinl.html.
184. Debt Collection Racket, supra note 180, at 1 (stating "[d]ebt collection abuses
stem largely from structural problems related to the buying and selling of old,
charged-off debts"); Debt Deception, supra note 44, at 5.
185. See, e.g., FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 8. The study ex-
amined approximately 90 million consumer accounts with a total face value of ap-
proximately $143 billion that sold over a three-year period for about $6.5 billion. The
average face value per account was about $1,605. Id. at tbl.2.
186. See Kristof, supra note 73. The subsequent buyer of a debt will typically pay
less than the previous buyer for the same debt. Debt Deception, supra note 44, at 5.
187. GAO REPORT, supra note 53, at 29.
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The sale price of a charged-off debt depends on several factors."'
Generally, sale price decreases with the age of a debt and the number of
times the debt has been through collection or resold.' In addition, the
state where the debt is located can affect the sale price.'" Debts in credi-
tor-friendly states like Ohio, that have liberal wage garnishment rules
may have higher sale prices than debts in debtor-friendly states, like
Texas, that restrict wage garnishment.1 9'
Although price points vary, debts typically sell at deep discounts.'92
In January 2013, the FTC released a comprehensive study of some of the
nation's largest debt buyers.'93 As part of that study, the FTC examined
3,400 portfolios-consisting of over 75 million consumer-debt accounts-
from six large debt buyers, for a three-year period beginning on July 1,
2006.194 The study found that on average, debt buyers paid four cents per
dollar of a debt's face value.'95 The average discount rate ranged from 7.9
cents per dollar for debts that were less than three years old, to 2.2 cents
per dollar for debts that were between six to fifteen years old. 96
Negotiation between the buyer and the seller focuses more on the
sale price, and less on the information transferred from the seller during
the transaction. As part of the sale, the buyer typically only receives sum-
mary data on the purchased debts. The seller often provides data on a
spreadsheet or database that lists names, Social Security numbers, and
the amount owed. 197 The FTC study found that buyers received the fol-
lowing information on purchased accounts:
188. FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 22-24.
189. GAO REPORT, supra note 53, at 28.
190. Id.
191. Id.; Fox, supra note 25, at 359-60. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2329.66(A)(13)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 2013) (exemption for wages is limited to the
greater of 75% of disposable earnings or thirty-times the federal minimum wage, if
paid weekly), with TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001(b)(1) (West Supp. 2013) (current
wages are entirely exempt from seizure, except for child-support payments).
192. FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 22-24.
193. Id. The study was touted as "the first large-scale empirical assessment of the
debt buying sector of the collection industry." Id. at i. The study examined nine of the
top buyers who purchased more than 75 percent of the debt sold in 2008. Id. at 8.
194. Id. at 22. The study primarily focused on six, rather than the original nine,
debt buyers because one of the original nine stopped buying debt and did not provide
data, and two other buyers specialized in purchasing bankruptcy debt. Id. at 8-9.
195. Id. at 23.
196. Id. at 23-24. Buyers purchased debts that were three to six years old at an
average rate of 3.1 cents per dollar, while debts over fifteen years were essentially
given away. Id.
197. Debt Deception, supra note 44, at 5; Spector, supra note 25, at 267; Goldberg,
supra note 24, at 746; Holland, supra note 24, at 268.
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(1) over 98% of debt accounts included the name, street address,
and [S]ocial [S]ecurity number of the debtor; (2) 70% set forth the
debtor's home telephone number, and 47% and 15% listed work
and mobile telephone numbers, respectively; (3) 65% included the
debtor's birth date; and (4) less than 1% revealed the debtor's
credit score."8
With respect to account information, the study found that all of the
accounts included the original creditor's account number and the debtor's
outstanding balance.' In addition, the seller provided the following time-
related information:
(1) 97% of accounts indicated the date the debtor opened the ac-
count: (2) 90% revealed the date the debtor made his or her last
payment; (3) 83% stated the date the original creditor charged off
the debt; and (4) 35% set forth the date of first default.200
Although buyers may receive the above information, the debts pur-
chased are often on an "as-is and with all faults" basis, and representa-
tions regarding the enforceability of the debts, or the accuracy of the
information transferred are not provided.20 1 Sellers, who typically draft
debt-purchase agreements, give buyers a limited right-if any-to return
accounts due to errors or omissions in the provided information.202 Addi-
tionally, sellers typically fail to provide collection history about sold debt,
including disputes from the alleged debtors, and results of attempts to
locate debtors.203 Similarly, resellers typically fail to provide updated col-
lection history to buyers.2 04
In addition, buyers do not usually receive the original loan docu-
ments, credit agreements, or even documents that reflect the assignment
198. FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 34.
199. Id. at 34-35.
200. Id. at 35.
201. Id. at 25; Debt Deception, supra note 44, at 5; Peter A. Holland, Defending
Junk-Debt-Buyer Lawsuits, 46 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 12, 14 (2012) ("[A]lmost every
agreement between original creditor and initial purchaser (and between the original
purchaser and each subsequent assignee) is made without representations and war-
ranties, without recourse, and often without any duty on the part of the seller to inves-
tigate the accuracy of what it is selling."). For a detailed analysis of over forty
purchase and sale agreements between debt buyers and banks see Jiminez, supra
note 25.
202. FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 25.
203. Id. at 36-37.
204. Id. at 37.
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of the claims.205 While some debt-purchase contracts may provide meth-
ods for obtaining documentation after the sale, they are typically limited
to a narrow time window, and may require additional payment by the
buyer.'* With each subsequent sale, less documentation is available to the
new purchaser.20
Insufficient documentation, representations, warranties, and ac-
count information for purchased debts have been associated with the in-
crease in the collection of zombie debts.2" Armed with insufficient
information, debt buyers make demands on the wrong people (oftentimes
individuals with similar names, addresses, or phone numbers), and for
incorrect amounts.209 For example, in FTC v. Capital Acquisitions & Man-
agement Corp, the FTC alleged that Capital Acquisitions & Management
Corp ("CAMCO"), a purchaser of debts with little or no documentation,
contacted and threatened individuals with similar names in the same geo-
graphic area.21 o Information provided by CAMCO's employees and con-
sumers confirmed CAMCO's practice of collecting and harassing
consumers merely because they had similar names or addresses as the
alleged debtors. CAMCO's employees stated that 50 percent to 80 per-
cent of the money collected by CAMCO came from individuals who did
205. Holland, supra note 24, at 268. The FTC 2013 study showed debt buyers re-
ceived documentation with 12 percent of accounts purchased. When provided, docu-
mentation was limited to: account statements, terms and condition documents, and
account application documents. Application documents were received in less than 1
percent of the cases, and account statements and "terms and conditions" documents
were received in about 6 percent of the cases. FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra
note 49, at 35. Debt buyers typically do not receive a breakdown of principal, interest,
and fees owed on purchased debts. Id. at 36.
206. FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 39-40.
207. Fox, supra note 25, at 360-61.
208. ROBERT I. HOBBS & CHI CHI Wu, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., MODEL
FAMILY FINANCIAL PROTECTION Acr, 4-5 (2012), available at http://www.nclc.org/
images/pdf/debt collection/model-family-financial-protection-act.pdf; Debt Decep-
tion, supra note 44, at 5; see also Holland, supra note 201, at 14 (explaining that insuf-
ficient information possessed by debt collectors leads to "dubious" default
judgments).
209. See generally Debt Deception, supra note 44, at 5 (explaining that the informa-
tion provided in the sale of debts "is insufficient to ensure that the debt buyers collect
the correct amount from the correct person").
210. Memorandum Supporting Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Re-
straining Order, Other Equitable Relief, and Order to Show Cause Why A Prelimi-
nary Injunction Should Not Issue at 4, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Capital Acquisitions &
Mgmt. Corp., No. 04-C-7781 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Capital Acquisitions
Ex Parte Motion]; see Jurgens & Hobbs, supra note 28, at 9.
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not owe the original debt.21 1 CAMCO and its affiliated companies settled
the FTC's claims by agreeing to pay a $1 million fine.2 12
Similarly, in 2009 and 2010, Bank of America sold credit-card ac-
counts to CACH LLC on an "as-is" basis, and included warnings that it
might not be able to produce documentation for the accounts, that some
accounts had been discharged in bankruptcy, that some account balances
were approximate, and that some accounts may have been paid.2 1 3 De-
spite these warnings, CACH LLC and its subsidiaries sought collection on
these accounts and filed pleadings in courts claiming ownership and valid-
ity of the debts, but failed to acknowledge Bank of America's "as-is"
warnings.2 1 4 Unfortunately, most of these matters have not been ad-
dressed by the courts as collectors typically obtain default judgments.2 15
The process of selling and reselling of debts also hinders the con-
sumer's ability to recognize debts that collectors seek to recover. 216 That
is, when a consumer receives a call from a debt buyer, who may be sev-
eral times removed from the original creditor, she may not remember the
debt or circumstances surrounding the debt. For example, if a consumer
purchases an item using a Kohl's credit card, she may not understand or
be told why she is receiving calls from Capital One, who had purchased
the debt from J.P. Morgan Chase, the original servicer of the account.217
211. Capital Acquisitions Ex Parte Motion, supra note 210, at 4; see Jurgens &
Hobbs, supra note 28, at 9.
212. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, CAMCO To Pay $1 Million to Settle Un-
fair, Deceptive Debt Collection Practices (Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.
gov/news-events/press-releases/2006/12/camco-pay-1-million-settle-unfair-deceptive-
debt-collection.
213. Jeff Horowitz, Bank of America Sold Card Debts to Collectors Despite Faulty
Records, AM. BANKER (Mar. 29, 2012, 6:31 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/
issues/177_62/bofa-credit-cards-collections-debts-faulty-records-1047992-1.html (re-
ferring to a sales agreement stating that the bank was not making "any representa-
tions, warranties, promises, covenants, agreements, or guaranties of any kind or
character whatsoever").
214. Id. See also Jeff Sovern, American Banker Articles on Debt Collection Prac-
tices, CONSUMER LAw & POLIcy BLOG, (Apr. 3, 2012, 3:58 PM), http://pubcit.typepad.
com/clpblog/2012/04/american-banker-articles-on-debt-collection-practices.html (ex-
plaining that the practice of knowingly collecting on such debts should be violations
under the FDCPA as "false representation of the character, amount, or legal status of
the debt[s]").
215. Horowitz, supra note 213.
216. FTC WORKSHOP, supra note 38, at 27-28.
217. In 2011, Capital One Financial Corp. became the issuer and servicer for new
Kohl's credit cards. As part of the agreement with Kohl's, Capital One also acquired
over twenty million accounts previously handled by J.P. Morgan Chase. Danielle
Douglas, Capital One Wins Deal to Back Kohl's Credit Cards, WASH. PosT, Apr. 10,
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Further, seller-imposed restrictions may also preclude the buyer
from revealing the name of the original creditor when initially communi-
cating with an alleged debtor.218 For example, the sale documents may
prohibit the use of the creditor or seller's name in the subject line of
correspondence with debtors.219 Additionally, the seller's contract terms
may prevent the release of contact information for the original creditor or
reseller.220 To further complicate matters, buyers may even change ac-
count numbers when collecting on purchased debt.22'
Therefore, debt resale increases the possibility that multiple entities
may improperly seek recovery on the same debt. With each sale, the sub-
sequent purchaser receives harder-to-collect debts and more limited in-
formation.222 This compounds the problem of "debt tagging," as buyers
ask consumers to pay debts that they do not owe.223 One commentator
has compared this predicament to the "old game of telephone," because
each subsequent purchaser receives less accurate and more incomplete
information.224 Since a subsequent purchaser does not receive the collec-
tion history that describes whether a consumer may have disputed or paid
the debt, the consumer must once again begin the collection-dispute pro-
cess with a new debt buyer.225 Consumers face the possibility of having to
relitigate collection matters that they have already won.226
Additionally, the debt buyer may not be the true owner of the
debt.227 For example, the seller may not have owned the purchased debt,
2011, http://washingtonpost/business/capitalbusiness/capital-one-wins-deal-to-back-
kohls-credit-cards/2011/04/07/AfdmSIFDstory.html.
218. See FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 26.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Berner & Grow, supra note 118.
222. HOBBS AND Wu, supra note 208, at 4; Fox, supra note 25, at 360-61.
223. For a discussion of collecting on debts that do not belong to the consumer, see
supra Part II.A.
224. Kristof, supra note 73; Ryst, supra note 73 ("The debt can change hands multi-
ple times, or even back and forth, and each message from one owner to the next is a
new opportunity for muddled information.").
225. FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 36-37.
226. See Rubin, supra note 155, at 17 ("Occasionally, but with some consistency,
debt buyers who lose a collection case will re-package the extinguished debt into one
of their regular portfolios and sell it to another debt buyer for further collection.");
see also David Segal, Debt Collectors Face a Hazard: Writer's Cramp, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/business/01debt.html?pagewanted=
all-r= 0 (describing how a sale of Chase accounts included accounts where consumers
had won judgments against Chase).
227. Holland, supra note 24, at 284.
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may not have properly transferred ownership, or may have even sold the
same debt to multiple entities.2
Therefore, the lack of documentation and account history creates
situations where debt buyers ask consumers to pay for debts that are al-
ready resolved, or where multiple buyers seek recovery on the same
debt.229
2. Debt Buyers' Motivations Contribute to the Collection of Zombie
Debts
Prior to the growth of the debt-buying industry, creditors tended to
give up on debts that they struggled to recover.23 With the advent of this
industry beginning in the late 1980s,231 these debts are now sold to buyers
who are often relentless in their pursuit of recovery. 23 2 Buyers have differ-
ent motivations or perspective than the original creditors or even collec-
tors hired by creditors.233 According to the Senate Report on the FDCPA,
Unlike creditors, who generally are restrained by the desire to
protect their good will when collecting past due accounts, inde-
pendent collectors are likely to have no future contact with the
consumer and often are unconcerned with the consumer's opinion
228. See DANIEL A. EDELMAN, COLLECTION LITIGATION ABUSE 2 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/debtcollectroundtablel/542930-00029.pdf
(describing cases in which debt buyers have sought recovery for debts that they did
not own); Edelman also quotes a trade article referring to "horror stories" [where]
"[t]he same portfolio is sold to multiple buyers; the seller doesn't actually own the
portfolio put up for sale; half the accounts are out of statute; accounts are rife with
erroneous information; access to documentation is limited or nonexistent." Id. (quot-
ing Corinna C. Petry, Do Your Homework; Dangers Often Lay Hidden in Secondary
Market Debt Portfolio Offerings. Here are Lessons from the Market Pros that Novices
can Use to Avoid Nasty Surprises, Collections & Credit Risk, Mar. 2007, at 24.). See
also Am. Acceptance Co., LLC. v. Goldberg, No.2:08-CV-9, 2008 U.S. Dist. WL
2074128, at *3 (N.D. Ind. May 14, 2008) (finding that seller never owned charged-off
accounts that it tried to sell).
229. See Holland, supra note 24, at 270-71 nn.74-79 and accompanying text. Some-
times, the same collector who settled a debt will subsequently file a lawsuit on the
same debt. Id. at 271 n.79 and accompanying text (citing Capital Credit & Collection
Serv., Inc. v. Armani, 206 P.3d 1114, 1116-18 (Or. Ct. App. 2009); see also Complaint
for Damages and Incidental Relief at 5, MacDowell v. LHR, Inc., No. 9:09-CV-81330-
KAM (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2009) (alleging that debt buyer restarted collection efforts
even after a court had determined in a prior suit that debt was not owed).
230. Allie Johnson, Attack of the Zombie Debt, MSN MONEY (Nov.12, 2012, 4:45
PM), http://money.msn.com/debt-management/attack-of-the-zombie-debt?page=2.
231. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
232. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 727-31.
233. Rivlin, supra note 15.
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of them. Collection agencies generally operate on a 50 percent
commission, and this has too often created the incentive to collect
by any means.234
In collecting their own debts, creditors may be concerned with ongo-
ing and future dealings with debtors. Debt collectors, on the other hand,
are not concerned about securing repeat business with debtors.235 They
have "no incentive to engender good will by treating the debtor with hon-
esty and respect."236 Buyers who purchase accounts at cents on the dollar
are even further removed from creditors (and the debtors) than collectors
working for creditors.237 Unlike collectors who operate on a commission
basis, buyers have a personal investment, and therefore their motivation
is to protect their investment and overhead. 238 Buyers only try to ascertain
whether they can easily recover on the debts, or if the debts should be re-
sold. Consequently, buyers who often possess limited and inaccurate in-
formation may be more aggressive in trying to collect than in ensuring
that the purchased debts are enforceable in the first place.239
These different motivations therefore lead to an increase in the col-
lection of zombie debts.240
234. S. REP. No. 95-382, at 2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1696
[hereinafter 1977 SENATE REPORT] (comments in the Senate Report to the FDCPA
on different incentives of debt collectors).
235. Id.
236. Ruth v. Triumph P'ships, 577 F.3d. 790, 797 (7th Cir. 2009); Richard Cordray,
Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Prepared Remarks at a Meeting of the National
Association of Attorneys General (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
speeches/prepared-remarks-of-richard-cordray-at-a-meeting-of-the-national-associa-
tion-of-attorneys-generall (describing the "mistreatment of the consumer" when debt
is given to a debt collector as creditors "may have little reason to ensure that debt
collectors treat consumers fairly and appropriately or that they maintain and use ac-
curate information").
237. Holland, supra note 201, at 13 (describing junk debt-buyers as "total strangers
to the consumer, and, hoping to make a killing, [who] have merely invested in a port-
folio of cheap assets").
238. Mayer, supra note 39 ("debt buyers who purchase paper at higher prices will
have to push consumers harder and harder to get their desired return on invest-
ment"); Rivlin, supra note 15 (quoting Dallas attorney, Jerry Jarzombek, as stating
"[t]he chances of abuse go way up when a collector has a financial stake in the
outcome").
239. See Holland, supra note 201, at 14 (purchased debts are frequently
unenforceable).
240. HOBBS AND Wu, supra note 208, at 4; see, e.g., Goldsmith & Martin, supra
note 25, at 372 ("collection efforts against ... time-barred debts have skyrocketed
since creditors discovered that they could sell debts they already have written off");
Goldberg, supra note 24, at 749-50 (discussing how debt buying has contributed to an
increase in the collection of time-barred debts).
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3. Competitive Forces in the Debt-Buying Industry-Another Factor
in the Growth of Zombie-Debt Collection
Rapid growth of, and increased competition within, the debt-buying
industry has resulted in reduced profit margins and has put pressure on
buyers to recover,24 ' which in turn has led to aggressive and often abusive
collection strategies.242 Lauren Goldberg has identified four competition-
driven "insidious tactics" practiced by debt buyers:
(1) evading U.S. laws by outsourcing activities overseas, (2) using
technology to target the most vulnerable debtors on the basis of
sex, age and income by using sophisticated phone systems and
software, (3) exploiting small-claims courts to obtain judgments
that would not be granted in normal litigation, and (4) pursuing
old debts after the statute of limitations has expired.243
In addition, competition is also a factor in increased efforts to collect on
debts discharged in bankruptcy.244 Some debt buyers specifically target
discharged 245 and time-barred debts.246 They do not seem to be concerned
about whether their targets actually owe their debts, have debts that are
time-barred, have discharged their debts, or have already been sued.247
Like the exponential growth of cinematic zombies, zombie debts have
exploded with the development of the debt-buying industry. As described
below, reforms are necessary to halt this growing problem.
IV. THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL EFFORTS TO CURB THE
GROWTH OF ZOMBIE DEBTS
In July 2010, the FTC reported that the "system for resolving dis-
putes about consumer debts is broken." 248 The report identified concerns
with the high incidence of default judgments, the failure of collectors to
provide identifying information in lawsuits, and the collection of time-
barred debts.249 At a workshop in June 2013, FTC Commissioner Julie
241. Haneman, supra note 24, at 715-16.
242. Id. at 716; Goldberg, supra note 24, at 728.
243. Goldberg, supra note 24, at 729.
244. Berner & Grow, supra note 118.
245. Id.
246. Holland, supra note 201, at 21.
247. Id. at 13.
248. FTC BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 53, at i.
249. Id. at ii-iii.
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Brill recognized that despite efforts to reform debt collection, "in most
respects, very little has changed." 25 0 She added:
[D]ebt buying raises many of the same significant consumer pro-
tection concerns that we described in our 2010 report, most nota-
bly that debt buyers may have insufficient or inaccurate
information when they collect on debts, which may result in col-
lectors seeking to recover from the wrong consumer or recover
the wrong amount.251
The traditional approaches rely on enforcement of federal and state law.
Neither has been successful in preventing the proliferation of zombie
debts.
A. The Federal Approach-The FDCPA Has Failed to Keep Pace with
Zombie-Debt Collectors
Since 1977, the FDCPA25 2 has served as the primary federal tool to
fight abuses by debt collectors.253 It purports to address harassment,
abuse, false or misleading representations, and unfair practices by collec-
tors. 254 Its focus on collectors reflects the heightened concerns that Con-
gress had with collectors, as opposed to original creditors who might rely
on future interactions with debtors.255
Although the term "zombie debts" had not yet become popular, the
FDCPA's legislative history reflects concerns about the incidence of zom-
250. Julie Brill, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Opening Remarks at the Life of




252. Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2006)).
253. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (stating that the purpose of the act was "to eliminate abu-
sive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors
who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disad-
vantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt
collection abuses"). See FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 4-5 (the
FTC typically asserts that actions that violate the FDCPA also violate section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices) and
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (regulating entities that provide information to credit
bureaus)).
254. See 15 U.S.C. H§ 1692d-1692f.
255. For a discussion of the legislative history recognizing the application of the
FDCPA to collectors as opposed to creditors, see supra notes 234-35 and accompany-
ing text.
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bie debts.256 For example, Congress heard testimony and received letters
from consumers who alleged harassment from collectors on debts that
they did not owe.257 Collectors testified that they often sought recovery
without knowing whether the debts were valid. 258 During the hearings,
Congress also heard reports of collectors seeking to recover on time-
barred debt.259 A collector conceded that it was a common practice to
request a minimal payment on a time-barred debt to restart the limita-
tions period. 26 Finally, in his signing statement for the FDCPA, President
Carter recognized the problem of collectors trying to recover from al-
leged debtors who did not owe debts.261
256. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. H1193 (daily ed. Feb.19, 1976) (statement of Rep.
Annunzio) (characterizing the collection of debts that are not owed as "tragic" and
stating that "[a] computer error or some other mistake has supplied an agency with a
name, address and amount to be collected and an unrelenting collector-working on
a percentage of what he can collect-has been set on the trail of the individual who
does not even owe the money").
257. See H.R. REP. No. 95-131, at 8 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.S.C.A.N.
[hereinafter HOUSE FDCPA REPORT] (stating "of the thousands of letters received
by the committee concerning debt collection problems, most . . . were from individu-
als who did not owe the debt in the first place or from people who were making
legitimate attempts to repay the money"); The Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearings
on H.R. 11969 Before the H. Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the H. Comm. on
Banking, Currency & Hous., 94th Cong. 63-66 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Hearings]
(consumer testifying about collector's attempts to recover debt for a newspaper sub-
scription that the consumer never had); Id. at 71 (Carolyn Fox testifying about at-
tempts to collect the debt of Claire E. Fox from her).
258. The Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearings on H.R. 29 Before the H. Sub-
comm. on Consumer Affairs of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. & Urban Affairs, 95th
Cong. 27 (1977) (stating testimony from a former debt collector: "[t]he debt collectors
feel that their job is not to find out if the money is owed but rather to collect the
money.... [A] debt collector who takes time to figure out if debts are owed instead of
just collecting them will soon be unemployed."); 1976 Hearings, supra note 257, at
29-30 (testimony of former debt collector acknowledging that "at least 50 percent" of
the record and book account debts that he was hired to collect "were not legitimate"
debts); Id. at 46 (describing the collector's technique of embarrassing a consumer so
he would pay even if the debt was not owed and stating that one collector had proudly
posted a letter over his desk that stated, "I don't owe this bill, but I am sending you
the money just to be rid of you.").
259. Id. at 30-31.
260. Id. (describing the practice of persuading the debtor to make a "token pay-
ment" of one dollar on a time-barred debt so that the "entire statute of limitations
was revamped and we now had an additional 6 years to collect his debt").
261. Presidential Statement on Signing the Consumer Protection Act Amendments
1977, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1628 (Sept. 20, 1977) (stating "[t]estimony ... was given during
the hearings on the bill showed that quite often innocent consumers-some of whom
had been misidentified as debtors-were harassed").
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At a superficial level, it appears that the FDCPA has the capability
to address zombie-debt concerns.262 The FDCPA purports to punish col-
lectors that falsely represent the "character, amount, or legal status of any
debt,"2 63 or collect amounts not "expressly authorized by the agreement
creating the debt or permitted by law.""26 Moreover, the FDCPA estab-
lishes verification requirements for collectors with the purpose of
"eliminat[ing] the recurring problem of debt collectors dunning the
wrong person or attempting to collect debts which the consumer has al-
ready paid."2 65 Specifically, the FDCPA requires collectors to communi-
cate the "amount of the debt" and "the name of the creditor to whom the
debt is owed" to the alleged debtor within five days of contacting her.266
Within thirty days after receipt of the validation notice, the consumer can
dispute the debt.267 If the debtor timely disputes the debt, then the collec-
tor is required to send verification of the debt before continuing collec-
tion efforts.2" Similarly, if the debtor requests the name and address of
the original creditor within the thirty days after receiving the validation
notice, the collector must cease collection efforts until she provides the
requested information.269
Despite its good intentions, the FDCPA's verification requirements
fail to provide consumers with sufficient information to determine
whether debts are dead. Although the collector must inform the con-
sumer of the FDCPA requirements in the validation notice, consumers
may not understand the notice, and, consequently, may fail to act within
the short thirty-day window.270 To obtain verification or information
about the original creditor, the debtor's request must be in writing.271 If
the alleged debtor fails to dispute the debt within the thirty-day window,
262. HOUSE FDCPA REPORT, supra note 257, at 8 ("This bill also protects people
who do not owe money at all. In the collector's zeal, collection efforts are often aimed
at the wrong person either because of mistaken identity or mistaken facts.").
263. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) (2006).
264. 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).
265. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 234, at 1699.
266. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
267. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3).
268. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4).
269. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5).
270. Walgenkim, supra note 24, at 75.
271. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4)-(5). Currently, the courts are split whether the valida-
tion dispute under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) must be in writing. Compare Hooks v.
Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d. 282, 286 (2d Cir. 2013) (writing not
required) and Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005)
(same) with Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991) (dispute notice
must be in writing under Section 1692g(a)(3)).
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the collector may assume that the debt is valid, and need not provide
verification or information about the original creditor.272
Even if a consumer submits a timely request, the verification pro-
vided by the collector is often not helpful in determining whether the
debt is dead debt.273 The FDCPA does not define verification,274 and the
FTC lacked sufficient rulemaking authority to provide guidance.275 Addi-
tionally, courts typically do not interpret verification to require that col-
lectors provide consumers with original documentation or detailed
statements.276
The influx of debt buyers and the growth of the debt-buying indus-
try has further exacerbated the problems with verification. From the
buyer's standpoint, although the buyer becomes the owner of the debt,277
it receives limited documentation and information from the sales transac-
272. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3)-(5) (2006).
273. Walgenkim, supra note 24, at 75-78.
274. FTC WORKSHOP, supra note 38, at 30.
275. Id. at 69-70; The FDCPA prohibited the FTC from issuing regulations con-
cerning debt collection. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 16921(d). One of the advantages of the new
CFPB is rulemaking authority over debt collectors. Matthew R. Bremner, Note, The
Fair Debt Collection Practice Act: The Need for Reform in the Age of Financial Chaos,
76 BROOK. L. REV. 1553, 1593 (2010-11). For a discussion of CFPB's rulemaking
authority, see infra notes 317-25 and accompanying text.
276. Courts are split on the exact requirements of effective verification. See
Michael D. Slodov, Documentation? I Don't Have to Show You Any Stinkin' Docu-
mentation! An Evaluation of the Verification Requirement of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b), 24
Lov. CONSUMER L. REV. 156, 160-68 (2011-12) (discussing judicial interpretations of
verification). Michael Slodov has divided court rulings into three categories: the docu-
mentation view, the responsive view, and the confirmation view. Id. at 160-67. The
"documentation view" represents the majority approach of the courts and focuses on
the statement from the collector that the amount sought is what the creditor claims is
due. Id. at 161-63 (citing Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d. 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1991) and
Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 406 (4th Cir. 1999)). The "responsive view" is a
minority view and requires that verification only address the specific dispute alleged
by the debtor. Slodov, supra, at 164-67 (citing Lamb v. M & M Assocs., No. C-3-96-
463, 1998 WL 34288694 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 1998)). Finally, the "confirmation view"
does not require any documentation; instead, it requires only a statement that the
consumer owes the debt. Slodov, supra, at 167 (citing Rudek v. Frederick J. Hanna &
Assocs., P.C., No. 1:08-CV-288, 2009 WL 385804, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 17, 2009)).
277. Some debt buyers have argued that they should be treated as creditors, not
subject to the FDCPA, because they own the debt; however, courts have typically
found that purchasers of defaulted debts are properly treated as collectors under the
FDCPA. See FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 3-4 (citing Kimber v.
Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1486 (M.D. Ala. 1987); McKinney v. Cadleway
Props. Inc., 548 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 2008)); see also Walgenkim, supra note 24, at
89-90 (suggesting that courts should recognize that debt buyers should be treated as
collectors subject to the disclosure and notice requirements of the FDCPA).
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tion.27 8 Moreover, the seller typically provides this limited information
without any warranty of accuracy.279 Often, the sale agreement will re-
strict the information that buyers can provide to debtors in their initial
communications with debtors.80 Additionally, buyers may change the ac-
count numbers of debts when corresponding with debtors.' Conse-
quently, the alleged debtor may not recognize the debt or the original
creditor when she receives the initial communication from a debt
buyer.282 Even if the debtor requests written verification of the debt in a
timely manner, often the buyer will have limited access to information
from the original creditor. 83 Typically, the debt buyer will simply confirm,
without documentation, the unwarranted and potentially inaccurate in-
formation that it obtained from the seller.28 As a result, the verification
and validation provisions in the FDCPA have not prevented the spread of
zombie debts.
Limited penalties and a short statutory limitations period also serve
as obstacles to private actions under the FDCPA. The parties most vul-
nerable to zombie-debt collection tend to be elderly, disabled, and low-
income individuals.285 Given the amount of debt involved, and a fear of
the expense and time involved in filing an action, these consumer groups
are not likely to file claims under the FDCPA.286 Moreover, a limited one-
year window to file an action asserting a violation makes it unlikely that
many individuals will seek timely relief.287 Finally, even if a consumer suc-
cessfully sues a collector, the FDCPA restricts recovery on these claims.
The current penalty limitations under the FDCPA are the same as those
when the FDCPA was first enacted in 1977.'s The FDCPA provides that
damages in individual actions are limited to the actual damages plus addi-
278. See supra notes 197-207 and accompanying text.
279. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
281. Berner & Grow, supra note 118.
282. See FTC WORKSHOP, supra note 38, at 27-28; see also Walgenkim, supra note
24, at 70 (alleging that "debt purchasers frequently attempt to escape liability under
the FDCPA by falsely claiming to be creditors").
283. See supra notes 206-207 and accompanying text.
284. FTC WORKSHOP, supra note 38, at 32 ("Many debt collectors have responded
to verification requests by only confirming in writing for consumers that the amount
demanded is what the creditor claims is owed. Collectors are conducting this minimal
effort at the same time that consumers increasingly complain about efforts to collect
from the wrong person or the wrong amount.").
285. Debt Collection Racket, supra note 180, at 1.
286. Debt Deception, supra note 44, at 1.
287. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (2006).
288. See FTC WORKSHOP, supra note 38, at 66.
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tional damages not exceeding $1,000.28 The $1,000 cap is on a per lawsuit
basis, rather than for each violation. 29 For class actions, additional dam-
ages are limited to the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the net worth
of the collector.291 Given today's multi-billion dollar debt-buying industry,
these limits are not effective deterrents.
Although the FDCPA contains language that purports to deal with
zombie debts, as a practical matter these provisions have not effectively
addressed the growth of zombie-debt collection that has accompanied the
development of the debt-buying industry.
B. State Approach: Lack of Uniformity Hampers Efforts to Control
Zombie Debts
Similarly, at the state level, traditional approaches have not ade-
quately addressed zombie-debt issues. One reason for enacting the
FDCPA was states' failure to address abuses in the collection process. 292
At the same time, however, the FDCPA recognized the importance of
joint efforts with state and local authorities, by allowing state provisions
to afford greater protections, and declaring that the FDCPA would not
preempt state provisions unless they were inconsistent with the
FDCPA.293
Following enactment of the FDCPA in 1977, most states enacted or
amended their existing statutes to regulate collectors. Many of these ef-
forts track the language used in the FDCPA.294 Some have expanded cov-
erage to include creditors as well as debt collectors.295 Some impose
licensing and bonds for collectors.296 Others require additional disclosures
289. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A); see FTC WORKSHOP, supra note 38, at 67 (recog-
nizing that $1,000 in 1977 would be the equivalent of $3,600 in 2008 dollars).
290. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A); see Harper v. Better Bus. Servs., Inc., 961 F.2d
1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1992).
291. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)); see FTC WORKSHOP, supra note 38, at 67 (recog-
nizing that $500,000 in 1977 would be the equivalent of $1.8 million in 2008 dollars).
292. 1977 SENATE REPORT, supra note 234, at 1696-97 ("The primary reason why
debt collection abuse is so widespread is the lack of meaningful legislation on the
State level.").
293. 15 U.S.C. § 1692n.
294. BBB STUDY, supra note 60, at 6 (noting that "Missouri is one of only a few
states without its own FDCPA"); FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 5.
295. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.2 (West 2009) (collector includes "any person
who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly, on behalf of himself or herself ...
engages in debt collection); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 392.001 (West 2006) ("debt col-
lector means a person who directly or indirectly engages in debt collection").
296. FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 5; see, e.g., TEX. FIN. CODE
ANN. § 392.101 (West 2006) (requires bond for debt collectors); WYo. STAT. ANN.
§§ 33-11-102, 33-11-108 (2013) (license and bond requirements).
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for collectors. For the most part, these requirements only apply during
litigation and are designed to reduce the incidence of improper default
judgments;297 however, some states have adopted additional pre-litigation
disclosure requirements.298 States may also provide consumer protection
through deceptive trade acts.2 99
To the extent that the state statutes simply adopt the language of the
FDCPA, they suffer from the same problems that handicap the practical
implementation of the FDCPA. While some of the alternative state ap-
proaches more effectively address zombie debts,30 the lack of uniformity
in these approaches, and the enactment of these additional measures by
only a few jurisdictions severely limit dealing with zombie debts on a na-
tionwide level.30' Moreover, limited state budgets also create enforcement
problems at the state and local levels.302
Efforts to address the failure of the traditional methods to curb the
growth of zombie debts must continue.o" While focusing on the abuses
associated with the high rate of default judgment, scholars, legislators,
297. FTC DEBT-BUYING INDUSTRY, supra note 49, at 5-6. These requirements may
be imposed by statute, regulation, or court rule. Id.; see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 58-70-150, 58-70-155 (West 2011) (establishing requirements for debt buyers filing
suit and obtaining default judgment); MD. CT. R. 3-306(d) (court rules requiring addi-
tional information for judgments by affidavit in cases involving assigned consumer
debt).
298. See, e.g.. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 392.202 (West 2006) (if a consumer disputes
a claim at any time, collector must respond in writing within thirty days denying or
admitting the inaccuracy or stating that it did not have sufficient time to complete the
investigation); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.07, 7.08 (2012) (establishing notice and dis-
closure requirements if seeking collection on time-barred debt, and requiring docu-
mentation reflecting debtor's signature if verification requested). New York City has
also issued regulations similar to the regulations implemented by Massachusetts.
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 20-493.2 (2012).
299. For a state-by-state description of unfair and deceptive practices acts, see
Carolyn L. Carter, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr., Consumer Protection in the States: A
50-State Report on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes (Feb. 2009),
available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50 states.pdf.
300. See infra Part V.B.3 for a brief discussion of New Mexico's efforts to address
abuses by collectors seeking to recover time-barred debts.
301. Some of the more promising alternatives are identified in the notes in Part V,
see infra.
302. Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys Gen-
eral after Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 154 (2013) (identifying the limited re-
sources of the offices of state attorneys general).
303. The FTC and National Consumer Law Center have responded by advocating
changes in state and federal laws to address the problems created by the rapid growth
in collection lawsuits and the debt-buying industry. See Jurgens & Hobbs, supra note
28, at 8; FTC BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 53, at ii-v; Lea Shepard, Creditors' Con-
tempt, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1509, 1548 (2011).
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and judges have stressed the importance of more stringent pleading and
evidentiary requirements for filing lawsuits and obtaining judgments in
debt-collection matters."* Although these litigation-related requirements
are a significant step to curb the growth of zombie debts, we should not
ignore collectors who improperly persuade consumers to pay unenforce-
able debts without litigation. Requirements that make it harder for debt
buyers to sue consumers may increase abuses at the pre-litigation level.
As described below, additional coordination between federal, state, and
local authorities lead by the CFPB and underpinned by amendments to
the FDCPA are required to effectively deal with zombie debts.
V. SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SLAYING
ZOMBIE DEBTS
This article now provides a framework for confronting zombie-debt
issues that arise before litigation, while recognizing that these efforts
should be part of a comprehensive strategy for dealing with zombie debts
at all stages of collection.305
A. A Framework for a Comprehensive Solution
Amending the FDCPA and relying on the recently formed CFPB
are the best options for attacking zombie-debt issues at the pre-litigation
stage. A framework that establishes minimum uniform standards through
the FDCPA, and uses the CFPB to coordinate regulation, enforcement,
and education at the federal, state, and local levels will help minimize the
level of zombie-debt collection."
1. Coordinate the Zombie-Debt Slayers-The CFPB and the FTC
On July 21, 2011, the CFPB began operations as the "first [federal]
government agency solely dedicated to consumer financial protection."307
The CFPB can be the "catalyst" for reducing and controlling the zombie-
304. This Article focuses on pre-litigation response to zombie debts. For informa-
tion about litigation responses, see supra note 25. For information about the high rate
of default judgment in collection matters, see supra notes 174-75 and accompanying
text.
305. A comprehensive approach is also necessary because efforts to prevent abuses
at the pre-litigation stage, could cause additional abuses by collectors who file lawsuits
to avoid the new pre-litigation requirements.
306. Relying on the CFPB does not preclude the use of state and local efforts. See
Totten, supra note 302, at 128. The CFPB can work with state attorney generals to
enforce consumer protection laws. Id. at 154-65.
307. CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 2.
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debt problem.30 s It can coordinate activities at the federal, state, and local
level. Professor Dee Pridgen has categorized the creation of the CFPB as
a "sea change" in consumer protection law in the United States.309 The
CFPB is the "new Sheriff in town [with] [r]isk assessment, risk manage-
ment, complaint management and robust compliance . . . [as] top
priorities."31o
Prior to the CFPB, various agencies regulated and enforced con-
sumer financial law, often leading to forum shopping and conflicting re-
sults." The advent of the CFPB consolidated these regulatory powers
into one agency.312 Additionally, CFPB's structure and authority gives it
stronger regulatory powers than the FTC's," including powers related to
funding, governance, scope of authority, and rulemaking.314 While the
FTC's funding is dependent upon congressional appropriation, the CFPB
receives its funding from the Federal Reserve and certain guaranteed ap-
propriations." The CFPB is governed by one director, while the FTC is
governed by five commissioners, with no more than three of them coming
from the same party.' The CFPB's expanded authority and rulemaking
powers affords the potential for resolving zombie-debt issues.' While the
FTC has the authority to review unfair and deceptive practices by non-
financial institutions, the CFPB's authority extends to all institutions and
includes review of abusive as well as unfair and deceptive practices.318
308. See Bremner, supra note 275, at 1588 (discussing how the CFPB can be a
"catalyst" to help with changes in FDCPA); Chi Chi Wu, Use Powers Federal Trade
Commission Lacked, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/roomforde-
bate/2013/07/21/consumer-finance-agencys-new-clout/use-powers-federal-trade-com-
mission-lacked (stating that the CFPB has the authority "to fix" the debt collection
and credit reporting "industries").
309. Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger Agency
& Stronger Laws, 13 Wyo. L. REV. 405, 405-406 (2013).
310. Berg et. al., supra note 60.
311. Pridgen, supra note 309, at 408-409.
312. Id. at 408-10.
313. Id. at 410-16.
314. Id. at 411-15; see Eric J. Mogilnicki & Melissa S. Malpass, The First Year Of
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Overview, 68 Bus. LAw. 557, 557
(2013) (describing how the CFPB was given "broad authority, secure funding, and a
powerful, independent director").
315. Pridgen, supra note 309, at 411.
316. Id. at 411-12.
317. Wu,supra note 308 ("The C.F.P.B. has powers that the F.T.C.... never had-
stronger tools to get inside [debt collection and credit reporting] companies, review
their procedures and policies, audit their interactions with consumers, and review the
accuracy of information in their files.").
318. Jean Braucher, Form & Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, 7
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. &COM. L. 107, 118 (2012-13) ("Now, one agency has power to
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Additionally, unlike the FTC's limited rulemaking authority, the CFPB
has broad rulemaking authority under the Administrative Procedure
Act,31 9 including the ability to propose regulations through notice-and-
comment rulemaking.3 20 The CFPB also tracks and responds to consumer
complaints regarding debt collection.321 Consumers can submit complaints
through the internet, mail, telephone, or fax.3 2 Additionally, the CFPB
database allows for online searches and downloading of data from the
complaint database. 323 Therefore, the CFPB is equipped with the neces-
sary tools to help tackle zombie-debt issues.
The CFPB has not been shy about using its authority and exercising
its regulatory powers.324 Since its creation, it has aggressively issued regu-
lations, participated in lawsuits, collected consumer complaints, and ex-
amined financial entities.3 25 In its 2013 annual report, the CFPB outlined
its activities involving the FDCPA.326 The 2013 report also describes the
CFPB rules for supervising debt collectors with more than $10 million in
annual receipts from consumer-debt collection, which represents nearly
two-thirds of the annual receipts from the debt-collection market, and
require disclosure under the Truth and Lending Act and to regulate unfair, deceptive,
and abusive practices.").
319. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (2006).
320. Pridgen, supra note 309, at 414-15.
321. CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 11.
322. Id.
323. See Consumer Complaint Database, CFPB (last visited Mar. 24, 2014), http://
www.consumerfinance.gov/complaintdatabase/.
324. The reforms that have been undertaken by CFPB are even more remarkable
given the substantial political opposition it has faced in creation and daily operation.
Concerns have been raised about the appointment of the director, funding, and con-
stitutionality. A detailed discussion of the history, politics, and current activities of the
CFPB is beyond the scope of this Article. For more information see Adam J. Levitin,
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 321 (2012-13); Susan Block-Lieb, Accountability and the Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & Com. L. 25 (2012-13) Despite this
opposition, the CFPB continues to press forward. One sign that the CFPB is effective
is that law firms are recruiting and hiring its lawyers. Jenna Greene, Firms Eye CFPB
Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., (June 10, 2013), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubAr-
ticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202603435755&thepage=1&slreturn=20130511135637.
325. Berg et. al., supra note 60; Mogilnicki & Malpass, supra note 314, at 558-59
(the first-year activities of the CFPB included "thirteen final rules, a study on private
student lending, a report on the three largest credit reporting agencies, countless ex-
aminations of banks . . . [as well as] a series of its own initiatives, including filing
amicus briefs on issues of interest . .. and seeking consumer input through field hear-
ings, town halls, and complaint portals on its website").
326. CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 2-3.
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includes debt buyers collecting on their debts.327 The report characterized
the CFPB's supervision program as establishing "for the first time" the
ability of a single federal agency to supervise creditors, collection firms,
and debt buyers at "every stage of the lending process-from credit origi-
nation to debt collection."3 28
Under the provisions that created the CFPB and the 2012 memoran-
dum of understanding between the FTC and CFPB,3 29 the agencies have
initiated a coordinated response to deal with problems in the debt-collec-
tion industry.330 In recent actions, the FTC has secured multi-million dol-
lar settlements against collectors for their alleged pursuit of zombie debt,
including against those who harassed consumers after being notified that
debts were not owed,33 1 and against those who collected on time-barred
debts.332
The CFPB and FTC have also coordinated their research, outreach,
and educational efforts to address collection abuse.333 The CFPB has ac-
tively sought input from state and local regulators, consumer groups, and
the collection industry.334 The CFPB and FTC have established educa-
327. Id. at 22-23.
328. Id. at 23.
329. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau
and the Fed. Trade Comm'n (Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/201 2/01 /federal-trade-commission-consumer-financial-protec-
tion-bureau.
330. Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on Shining a Light on
the Consumer Debt Industry, Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Con-
sumer Prot. of S. Comm. on Banking Hous., & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 14 n.32
(2013) [hereinafter 2013 Hearings] (statement of Reilly Dolan, Acting Assoc. Dir.,
Div. of Fin. Practices, Fed. Trade Comm'n) available at http://www.banking.senate.
gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Testimony&HearingID=d69d5a6b-
aa86-4f4e-8b73-88814703f473&WitnessID=44bbf66e-84e9-480d-a33f-cc6e71c841bf
(citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 § 1024(c)(3) (July 21, 2010)).
331. Id. at 4 n.12 (citing United States v. Expert Global Solutions, Inc., No. 3-13
CV 26 2611-M (N.D. Tex. July 8, 2013) in which the FTC obtained a record $3.2
million settlement).
332. Id. at 5 (citing United States v. Asset Acceptance, L.L.C., No. 8:12-cv-182-T-
27EAJ (M.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2012) in which the FTC obtained a $2.5 million settlement);
see also Federal Trade Commission, supra note 89.
333. 2013 Hearings, supra note 330, at 14; CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 40, at 39-42.
334. CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 35-41. In February 2013, the
director of the CFPB discussed some of the collaborative efforts between the CFPB
and the states. See Cordray, supra note 236.
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tional programs for consumers and businesses.335 In June 2013, the FTC
and CFPB co-hosted a roundtable on data integrity in the debt-collection
process.33 ' The roundtable, which was free and open to the public, was
streamed live to allow for widespread viewing of the proceedings. 3 7 Pan-
elists at the roundtable included representatives from academia, the FTC,
the CFPB, the debt-buying industry, state attorney general offices, and
consumer associations, as well as judges and attorneys involved in collec-
tion proceedings.3 " They discussed in detail the debt-buying process, in-
cluding concerns that the process often left collectors without adequate
documentation or dispute information about debts.33 9
The CFPB should continue its efforts to address the issue of zombie
debts. The CFPB is in the unique position of being able to regulate, en-
force, and coordinate a resolution that involves efforts at federal, state,
and local levels.340
2. Establish Uniform Standards to Attack Zombie Debts-
Amending the FDCPA
Just as the CFPB can serve as the overall coordinating body to deal
with zombie-debt problems, the FDCPA provides the vehicle for estab-
lishing minimum standards to combat zombie-debt issues. Uniform fed-
eral standards would benefit both consumers and collectors. Anticipating
upcoming reform, collectors and debt buyers have stated that they would
prefer uniform standards as opposed to piecemeal state-by-state regula-
tions." Similarly, for consumers who are required to navigate conflicting
335. 2013 Hearings, supra note 330, at 9-10; CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 40, at 39-41.
336. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Federal Trade Commission, Consumer Fi-
nancial Protection Bureau to Co-Host Roundtable on Data Integrity in Debt Collec-
tion (May 2, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/05/lifedebt.shtm.
337. Id.
338. The biographies of the speakers and panelists are available at http://www.ftc.
gov/bcp/workshops/lifeofadebt/ (last visited July 15, 2013).
339. Id.; Fred Williams, Reporter's Notebook: 'Broken' Debt Collection Process
Getting a DC Makeover, CREDITCARDS.COm (June 7, 2013), http://blogs.creditcards.
com/2013/06/broken-debt-collection-process-dc-makeover.php.
340. For a discussion of the potential role of coordinated enforcement between the
states and the CFPB, see Totten, supra note 302, at 154-65.
341. Representatives of the collection and debt-buying industry acknowledged at
the FTC/CFPB roundtable conference in June 2013 that uniform standards should be
established for information and documentation to be provided to consumers in pre-
litigation collection communications. See Trevor Salter, Lost in Translation? Ensuring
Appropriate Documentation in the Pre-Litigation Debt Collection Process, CFPB
MONITOR, June 7, 2013, http://www.cfpbmonitor.com/2013/06/07/lost-in-translation-
ensuring-appropriate-documentation-in-the-pre-litigation-debt-collection-process/;
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state laws, federal provisions could establish a baseline for the informa-
tion that collectors should provide to alleged debtors. States may choose
to require additional information, but the hope is that federal standards
would address the concerns of most states and provide uniformity.342 Al-
though the FDCPA was originally enacted in 1977 to provide a federal
solution to help states combat abuses in the collection process, "[t]oday's
collection industry is markedly different from the industry contemplated
when Congress enacted the FDCPA."343 As in 1977, the time is ripe for a
new federal approach. This approach, as discussed below, requires
amendments to the FDCPA and enforcement by the CFPB.
B. Proposed Methods to Slay Zombie Debts Before Litigation
Specific amendments to the FDCPA and specific actions by the
CFPB offer the greatest potential for reducing zombie debt. While some
states and localities have recently begun to develop some of these meth-
ods, a comprehensive nationwide approach is necessary to combat zom-
bie debt.3" This approach should ensure that debt buyers and consumers
have adequate information, documentation, and knowledge to assess
whether debts are enforceable. Additionally, effective sanctions are nec-
essary to deter violations by collectors.
1. Require Debt Sellers to Transfer Information and Documentation
at the Time of Sale to Allow for Identification of Zombie Debts
The FDCPA should specifically address the sale of charged-off
debts, and the CFPB should establish regulations to provide guidance for
such sales. The problems generated by the growth in the debt-buying in-
dustry are widespread. Safeguards and protections must ensure that at the
time of sale, debt buyers receive accurate information about purchased
debts. Buyers should receive a complete itemization of payments and
charges made on purchased accounts. Similar to a chain of title in real
Fred Williams, supra note 339 (stating that industry representatives understand that
changes are inevitable, but hope they will be "consistent and nationwide"); Patrick
Lunsford, ARM Data Exchange Standards Focus of FTC/CFPB Collection Round-
table, INSIDEARM.Com, (June 7, 2013) http://www.insidearm.com/daily/debt-buying-
topics/debt-buying/arm-data-exchange-standards-focus-of-ftccfpb-collection-round-
table/ (creating standards was a theme of the roundtable).
342. See, e.g., Totten, supra note 302, at 128 (describing that, under the Dodd-
Frank Act, "federal law is a floor, not a ceiling").
343. CFPB 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 9 (recognizing that the size
and scope of the debt-buying industry was not contemplated in 1977).
344. The reforms are primarily directed at the litigation stage; however, some also
confront zombie-debt issues that arise before litigation. For a discussion of some of
these reforms, see supra notes 295-98 and accompanying text.
374 [Vol. 44
Summer 2014] PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM ZOMBIE-DEBT COLLECTORS 375
estate transactions, sellers should provide information about all prior
owners of their debts.345 Rather than simply receiving summary data in a
spreadsheet, buyers should receive documentation that shows the agree-
ment between the original creditor and the debtor, as well as documenta-
tion that shows assignment or sale to all subsequent holders of the debt.
Finally, debt buyers should receive a full dispute history of each debt to
ensure that consumers will not have to reassert defenses every time a
debt is sold.346
While the above suggestions may appear to be a major undertaking
for the debt-buying industry, the CFPB acknowledges that the request for
"clear standards for data integrity and record-keeping in the debt collec-
tion market"347 has now reached a "consensus across all market partici-
pants-from debt collectors, creditors, and collection attorneys, to
consumer advocates, legal service providers, and state attorneys gen-
eral."M Additionally, technology now allows for warehousing of account
documents and tracking information online." 9 For example, Convoke
345. See Daniel J. Langin, Introducing Certainty to Debt Buying: Account Chain of
Title Verification for Debt, Jan. 5, 2011, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/
debtcollecttechworkshop/00027-60064.pdf (advocating an account chain of title sys-
tem for debt ownership using centralized recordkeeping similar to the system used for
tracking real estate title).
346. Under California's recently enacted Fair Debt Buying Practices Act, Califor-
nia has established some similar requirements; however, most notably, the require-
ments do not apply to oral communications and do not require transfer of dispute
history. Fair Debt Buying Practices Act, CAL. CIV. CODE H§ 1788.50-1788.64 (West
2014). The Act, which became effective on January 1, 2014, requires that debt buyers
refrain from written statements to collect debts until they have information including
(1) that the debt buyer is the sole owner of the debt, (2) the charge-off balance, post-
charge off interest and fees, (3) date of default or last payment, (4) identification of
the charge-off creditor and associated account number, (5) identification of debtor's
name, address, and account number that the charge-off creditor had, and (6) names
and addresses of all buyers of the debt. Id. The Act also requires that debt buyer has
access to evidence of debtor's agreement to the debt before making written demands.
Id.
347. 2013 Hearings, supra note 330, at 3 (citing statement of Corey Stone, Assis-
tant. Dir. for the Office of Deposits, Cash, Collections, and Reporting Mkts., Con-




349. Williams, supra note 339 ("Instead of passing around account records from
creditors to debt buyers, [data management companies] can warehouse the records
digitally in a cloud-based system, tracking the account's ownership as it changes hands
and updating it with any payments made or disputes of the debt along the way.");
Salter, supra note 341 (noting industry representatives acknowledged that "the neces-
sary technology exists"); Patrick Lunsford, New Technology to Aid Debt Purchasers
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Systems, Inc. claims that its software "solution provides credit issuers and
all subsequent debt buyers or third party agencies with the ability to man-
age media and track chain of title, from charge-off to debt resolution.""'
Warehousing allows a debt reseller to simply add any new documentation
and dispute history to the file when transferring it to a new buyer.
While these suggestions do not explicitly address the problem of un-
warranted data provided by sellers, by requiring actual documentation,
full itemization of payments and charges, and a complete history of dis-
putes with debtors, the debt buyer should have improved tools for evalu-
ating whether purchased debts are dead debts.
2. Require Collectors to Provide Consumers with Information and
Documentation
Providing debt buyers with accurate records and documentation is
only a partial solution; a comprehensive framework for addressing zom-
bie debts would also require buyers to relay this information to consum-
ers at the time of contact. Just as courts and legislatures are beginning to
address the failure of collectors to provide information about debts when
they file lawsuits or seek default judgments, collectors should also be re-
quired to provide information when they attempt to collect during pre-
litigation interactions with alleged debtors. Consumers could then deter-
mine whether the alleged debts are indeed debts they owe, whether they
are still outstanding, and whether they are not time-barred. Accordingly,
amendments to the FDCPA should require that collectors provide the
following information when contacting an alleged debtor through oral or
written communications:
a. Name, address and account number of the original creditor,
and, if the original creditor is servicing an account for a
merchant, the name, address, and account number of the
merchant.
b. Names, addresses, and account numbers of all other owners of
the debt.
with Media, INSIDEARM.com, (Feb. 4, 2008) http://www.insidearm.com/daily/debt-
buying-topics/debt-buying/new-technology-to-aid-debt-purchasers-with-media.
350. Press Release, Convoke Systems, Convoke Systems, Inc. Announces First So-
lution for Real-time Access to Account Media and Chain of Title Tracking (Jan. 30,
2008), http://convokesystems.com/Convoke-Systems-SolutionJanauary_30-2008
Final.pdf. Similarly, Global Debt Registry claims on its website that "[tihe ... purpose
of the registry is to maintain and establish accurate ownership of delinquent receiva-
ble accounts which allows for delivery of requested media directly to downstream
buyers in the secondary charged-off debt market." GLOBAL DEBT REGISTRY, http://
www.dibbledot.com/gdr/index.html (last visited on July 24, 2013).
376 [Vol. 44
Summer 2014] PROTECTING CONSUMERS FROM ZOMBIE-DEBT COLLECTORS 377
c. An itemization of all amounts owed.
d. A statement of the last payment made by the debtor-includ-
ing the amount and date of payment.
Additionally, consumers should have the right to view documenta-
tion that demonstrates the following:
a. The debtor's agreement to the original debt-e.g., a copy of a
document that shows the debtor's signature.
b. The assignments of debt to other owners.
Moreover, the timeline for consumers to make the request for docu-
mentation should not be limited by a thirty-day dispute window.3"' All
collection activities should be suspended until the collector provides the
requested information to the consumer. Using its rulemaking authority,
the CFPB should issue regulations to force collectors to meet the require-
ments imposed by these amendments.35 2
3. Require Collectors to Notify Consumers about the Consequences
of Paying or Acknowledging Unenforceable Debts
While providing information to consumers is important, it too, is a
limited solution unless consumers are informed about the potential for
zombie-debt issues, and the impact of making payment or acknowledging
such debts. Support for this type of disclosure is beginning to develop in
the area of time-barred debts;35 3 however, the disclosure requirements
should be explicitly extended to all forms of unenforceable debts.
In 2010, Professors Timothy Goldsmith and Nathalie Martin re-
ported the results of an empirical study that determined the impact of
providing information about time-barred debts to consumers.354 The study
divided consumers into two groups-A and B-that were statistically
similar based on sex, age, education, income, and debt.3 The participants
351. In 2012, the Attorney General in Massachusetts issued regulations requiring a
creditor (defined to include a debt buyer) to provide a debtor who has disputed a debt
with all documents reflecting the "signature of the debtor and which concern the
debt" as well as "[a] ledger, account card, account statement copy, or similar record
... which reflects the date and amount of payments, credit balances, and charges
." 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.08(2) (2012). The regulations, however, require that
the debtor dispute the debt in writing within thirty-days after notice of validation by
the creditor.
352. Bremner, supra note 275, at 1593-94 (advocating that the CFPB establish
standardized forms for compliance with the FDCPA's disclosure requirements).
353. See infra notes 361-63 and accompanying text.
354. Goldsmith & Martin, supra note 25, at 372.
355. Id. at 379.
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in each group were asked how likely they would be willing to pay a debt
that they had stopped making payments on more than six years ago. The
study informed Group A that the debt was not enforceable in court be-
cause the enforcement period had expired. Group B did not receive this
notice. 356 As expected, the pay-rate response by Group A was signifi-
cantly lower than that of Group B.357 Goldsmith and Martin concluded
that given this difference, knowledge of the expiration of the limitations
period is a material consideration for debtors in deciding whether to
make payments. 8
The New Mexico Attorney General's office used the results from
this study to settle a lawsuit that alleged that a collector's failure to dis-
close that it was collecting time-barred debts was a deceptive trade prac-
tice. 359 The settlement resulted in a cash payout and an injunction that
prohibited the collection of time-barred debt without disclosing that the
debt would not be enforceable in a court action.36 Subsequently, New
Mexico issued regulations in 2010 that prohibit the collection of time-
barred debts, unless the collector discloses that the debts would not be
enforceable in court, and that partial payment or acknowledgement of
the debt could result in restarting the limitations period. 361 A limited
number of jurisdictions have adopted similar legislation or regulations.362
Additionally, in 2012 the FTC imposed disclosure requirements as a con-
dition of settlement with collectors who allegedly pursued time-barred
debts.363
Therefore, FDCPA amendments should require collectors to pro-
vide information about unenforceable debts when they contact alleged
356. Id. at 377.
357. Id. at 379-80.
358. Id. at 380.
359. Id.
360. Goldsmith & Martin, supra note 25, at 380.
361. 12.2.12 NMAC (12/10/2010).
362. See, e.g., 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 7.07 (2012); N.Y.C. ADMIN CODE § 20-493.2
(2012). California's recently enacted Fair Debt Buying Practices Act requires that
buyers collecting on time-barred debts disclose that they will not sue on such debts,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.52(d)(2)-(3) (West 2014). Similarly, effective June 6, 2014,
collectors in West Virginia are also required to make this disclosure when collecting
on time-barred debts. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2-128(f) (2014).
363. Consent Decree, United States v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, No. 8:12-cv-182-T-
27EAJ (M.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523133/
120131assetconsent.pdf (requiring disclosures if know or should know that debt is
time-barred). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has also recently decided that a
debtor may have a misrepresentation claim under the FDCPA if a collector knowingly
seeks to collect time-barred debt without disclosing that the debt is time-barred. Mc-
Mahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 744 F.3d 1010, 1020 (7th Cir. 2014).
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debtors, and also inform alleged debtors about the consequences of mak-
ing payment or making an acknowledgment. Moreover, such require-
ments should not be limited to time-barred debts; they should extend to
debts that may not belong to the debtor, and to debts that may have been
paid, settled, or discharged in bankruptcy.
4. Educate Consumers about Zombie-Debt Issues
Sending notice to consumers is a significant step; however, if con-
sumers do not understand the notices, these notices will not be effective.
Accordingly, notices should enable consumers to comprehend the con-
tent of the notices."* Given that the elderly and low-income individuals
are particularly susceptible to debt collectors," education and assistance
efforts should particularly target these groups.
To its credit, the CFPB has already begun this process. It has created
action letters for consumers to send to collectors to dispute debts and
obtain information."* Additional form letters could address zombie-debt
issues and the FDCPA amendments proposed in this article. For example,
consumers should have access to form letters that request documentation
revealing a complete itemization of the amounts requested, and amounts
and dates of payments received, as well as the full names and addresses of
the alleged debtor, and all past and present holders of the debt.
Currently, the CFPB provides some education and outreach ef-
forts.367 The CFPB offers assistance directed to elderly consumers.368
These efforts as well as information posted on the CFPB's website should
specifically address zombie-debt issues and focus on those who are most
364. Excessive information provided to consumers can be overwhelming. See Adi
Osovsky, The Misconception of the Consumer as a Homo Economicus: A Behavioral
Economic Approach to Consumer Protection in the Credit Reporting System, 46 SUF-
FOLK U. L. REv. 881 (2013). A discussion of what constitutes effective notice is be-
yond the scope of this Article. For more detail, see Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does
Disclosure Matter? (NYU Ctr. for Law, Econ. and Org., Working Paper No. 10-54,
2010) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1713860.
365. Debt Collection Racket, supra note 180, at 1.
366. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Puts Companies on Notice About
Harmful Debt Collection Practices, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, (July 10, 2013)
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201307_cfpb-factsheet-debt-collection.pdf (last vis-
ited July 25, 2013).
367. CFPB Web Team, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, We're 732 Days Old:
Here's What We've Been Up To, (July 22, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/
blog/hbd/.
368. Financial Protection for Older Americans, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/older-americans/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2013).
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in need of assistance. The CFPB should coordinate education efforts at
the federal, state, and local level to address zombie-debt concerns.
Given the disproportionate number of consumer cases that involve
low-income individuals, the use of legal aid and law-school clinics also
provide methods for helping consumers faced with demands from collec-
tors.369 Professor Peggy Maisel and Research Fellow Natalie Roman con-
ducted an informal survey of two hundred law clinics, and detailed
interviews with sixteen clinic directors and faculty members to determine
what law schools were doing to help low-income consumers.370 Their arti-
cle highlights the variety of approaches and significant successes that clin-
ics have had in helping low-income consumers by providing advice and
representation in foreclosure, collection, and bankruptcy matters.3 7 In
addition to traditional representation in bankruptcy, litigation, and appel-
late matters, students in the clinics have provided consumer-education
workshops, have conducted pre-litigation discussions with collectors,
have mediated disputes, and have helped draft and advocate consumer
legislation and regulation. 372 These clinics are "win-win" situations as they
help consumers with their issues, as well as offer practical, real-life exper-
iences to law students.3 73
Providing legal assistance to consumers in collection matters has
been successful. A 2013 study found significantly lower rates of default
judgment in collection cases against residents who lived in New York City
compared to citizens that lived outside the city.3 74 The study attributed the
differences in part to free legal services offered by the court, local attor-
369. Peggy Maisel & Natalie Roman, The Consumer Indebtedness Crisis: Law
School Clinics As Laboratories For Generating Effective Legal Response, 18 CLINICAL
L. REV. 133 (2011); see also APPLESEED REPORT, supra note 176, at 32-35 (advocat-
ing the use of legal clinics, voluntary service, and students to help consumers with
debt-collection litigation).
370. Maisel & Roman, supra note 369, at 148-49.
371. Id. at 147-70.
372. Id.; see also Mary Spector, From Representation To Research And Back Again:
Reflections On Developing An Empirical Project, 16 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 55 (2012)
(describing the efforts of students in SMU's civil clinic in representing consumers in
collection matters and drafting rules to help consumers).
373. Maisel & Roman, supra note 369, at 136. Similarly, law students have also
been involved in helping veterans obtain benefits. See Andrew Ostler, Law Students
Help Speed up Backlogged Veterans Benefits Claims, JD JOURNAL (May 28, 2013),
available at http://www.jdjournal.com/2013/05/28/law-students-help-speed-up-backlog-
ged-veterans-benefits-claims/ (describing the partnership between the Veteran's Ad-
ministration and the pro-bono clinic at William & Mary Law School to help reduce
delays in the processing of veteran's benefits).
374. Debt Collection Racket, supra note 180, at 4-12.
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neys, and legal-aid groups in New York City."' Similar efforts should ad-
dress consumers who receive pre-litigation communications from
collectors.
5. Amend the FDCPA's Penalty and Limitation Provisions
While the amendments and suggestions above are crucial to mitigate
zombie-debt issues, they will not be effective unless they are enforced,
and the penalty structure for non-compliance deters zombie-debt collec-
tors. The debt-buying industry has been characterized as a "$100 billion
per year industry";... accordingly, to help consumers combat zombie-debt
collectors, the limited penalties for individual suits and class actions, as
well as the one-year limitation period under the FDCPA should be
amended. The penalties and the limitation periods remain unchanged
since the FDCPA's enactment in 1977.17' They no longer reflect the eco-
nomic realities of the multi-billion dollar debt-buying industry that con-
sists of hundreds of companies, including publicly traded companies. At
the very least, Congress should index penalties to inflation 7 and consider
awarding penalties on a per-violation basis instead of a per-lawsuit ba-
sis.3 79 Similarly, recognizing the impact of debt buyers on the growth of
zombie debts, the FDCPA should specifically state that it applies not only
to collectors, but also to debt buyers.380
CONCLUSION
While many people enjoy watching or reading about fictional
zombies, zombie debts are real, and cause financial havoc for consumers.
It is time to attack these real zombies. This Article has presented a gen-
eral framework, and specific solutions to reduce zombie-debt collection.
Additionally, recognizing that zombie-debt collectors may, like fictional
zombies, be adept at finding new methods to avoid destruction, our ap-
proach must be flexible enough to respond quickly to changing industry
practices and improvements in technology.
375. Id. (stating that additional notice requirements adopted by the New York City
Courts also helped to explain the lower rates of default judgment in the city).
376. Holland, supra note 24, at 259.
377. See supra notes 288-91 and accompanying text.
378. FFC WORKSHOP, supra note 38 at 66-67; Bremner, supra note 275, at
1589-90.
379. See FORBES, supra note 7.
380. See Walgenkim, supra note 24, at 90-91 (stating that despite the clear lan-
guage of the FDCPA debt buyers have argued that they are not collectors under the
FDCPA).
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The FDCPA did not anticipate the growth of debt buyers in 1977.
Now, we should be careful to monitor and be ready to react to factors
that may increase the rate of zombie-debt collection. We must be proac-
tive. Continued study, research, and evaluation of the approaches sug-
gested in this article would help to track the practices of the debt-
collection industry. The current efforts of the CFPB and the FTC to miti-
gate zombie-debt issues should be encouraged. The CFPB complaint
database offers analysts the ability to assess debt-collection data."' The
information included in this database should also track zombie-debt con-
cerns, namely, time-barred debts, debts that do not belong to consumers,
and debts that have been paid, settled, or discharged. We should monitor
the efforts of jurisdictions such as California, Massachusetts, New Mex-
ico, New York City, and West Virginia to address zombie debt at the pre-
litigation stage. Just as citizens in horror movies need to recognize
zombies and possess the proper weapons and skills to kill them, consum-
ers in the real world must understand when debt buyers are seeking to
collect zombie debts, and should possess the appropriate tools and knowl-
edge to defeat zombie-debt collectors.
381. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall & Sonia Steinway, Skeletons in the Database:
An Early Analysis of the CFPB's Consumer Complaints (Working Paper, July 17,
2013) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2295157 (exam-
ining the 110,000 complaints filed with the CFPB). Similarly, empirical research is
necessary to further address the efficacy of legal assistance programs. For a descrip-
tion of a current study regarding consumer debt collection, see Dalid Jimbnez, D.
James Greiner, Lois R. Lupica & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Improving the Lives of Indi-
viduals in Financial Distress Using a Randomized Control Trial: A Research and
Clinical Approach, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 449 (2013).
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